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Abstract 
 
The massive downsizing of the state-owned sector and the concomitant impressive 
growth of the private sector at the end of the 1990s have altered the nature of the 
Chinese labor market. The introduction of market mechanisms has contributed to 
increasing labor turnover and competitiveness in market wages. Using two urban 
household surveys for 1995 and 2002, this paper analyzes the evolution of labor 
market segmentation in urban China, by applying an extended version of Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition methods. During the 7-year period, the sharp increase in real 
earnings for all workers shows substantial differences across ownership, economic 
sectors, and regions. We find strong evidence of a multi-tiered labor market along 
these three major lines and highlight increasing segmentation within each of the three 
dimensions, the gap between the privileged segments of the labor market and the most 
competitive segments widening over time. 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Since the launching of the policy of reform and opening-up in the late 1970s, both 
rural and urban labor markets in China have changed dramatically. By allowing 
market mechanisms to play a greater role in wage-settings and labor mobility to 
reappear, economic liberalization has revived incentive mechanisms and improved the 
efficiency of labor allocation across sectors, enterprises, and regions1. Despite the 
loosening enforcement of the hukou system2 that seriously impedes rural-urban 
migration, rural and urban labor markets remain highly segmented. Within both urban 
and rural labor markets, various rigidities also remain and reforms are still uneven and 
incomplete. In particular, restrictions on labor mobility across sectors and ownership 
in the urban labor market have remained quite strong until the mid-1990s (Knight and 
Song 1995; Zhao 2002; Chen et al.2005).  
                                                 
1 The labor mobility from agricultural to non-agricultural sectors has been pointed out as a significant 
source of economic growth in China since the beginning of the reforms (Cai (2005)). 
2 The household registration system (hukou system) was established in 1958 to restrict migrations both 
between rural and urban areas and across regions. The main institutional barrier to mobility was the 
exclusion of rural residents from the urban welfare system then established, which provided housing, 
medical care, education, childcare, and pension to urban residents (Cheng and Selder (1994)). 
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 Labor market segmentation arises when labor market is made up of several segments 
with distinct rules for wage determination and a limited mobility of labor between 
segments. In China, where the so-called “iron rice bowl” of lifetime employment in 
state-owned enterprises was the norm until it was completely dismantled in 1994 
(Knight and Song 2005), the issue of the public sector efficiency may be of special 
importance. A multi-tiered labor market in which wages are not only determined by 
skill differentials, but also by different institutional arrangements may have strong 
implications in terms of both labor allocation across sectors and income distribution 
among workers. In the case of China, Zhao (2002) and Chen et al. (2005) found that 
the payment of high non-wage benefits in state-owned enterprises prevented labor 
from moving out of the state sector in the mid-1990s.  
 
Urban employment in China has increased from 95 million in 1978 to 265 million in 
2004, but from the mid-1990s onward, the employment situation in most cities started 
to deteriorate, with the number of jobs not increasing as fast as the labor force, and 
thus leading to rising unemployment in urban areas3. Although the official registered 
unemployment rate in urban areas stands at 4.2 percent (8.27 million people in 2004), 
actual unemployment is estimated to be much more severe, especially when 
unemployment in the form of laid-off workers (xiagang) is considered (Lai 2005). 
While the exact number of laid-off workers remains largely unknown, estimates 
provided by the National Bureau of Statistics indicate that there would have been 70 
to 80 million workers laid off between 1998 and 2002 from public and non-public 
enterprises4 (Li and Bai 2005). 
 
Overall, the basic patterns in urban employment that have emerged are related to 
enterprise ownership, sector, and regional location. First, urban unemployment mainly 
                                                 
3 Except as otherwise indicated, all macroeconomic data on employment in China are official data from 
the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). 
4 The sum of laid-off workers at the beginning of 1998 with newly added laid-off workers during the 
period from 1998 to 2002 amounts to 27 million (NBS 2003, p. 134). According to Li and Bai (2005), 
the number of workers laid-off from other types of enterprises would be roughly 50 million. Within 
state-owned enterprises, the laid-off policy has been implemented largely in small-scale enterprises 
owned by local governments, which have suffered financial losses (Dong (2003)). 
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comes from urban state-owned industrial enterprises. While total employment in 
urban areas has increased over the years, employment in state-owned units has 
steadily decreased since the mid-1990s, from 112.6 million in 1995 down to 70 
million in 2004. The reduction of employment in state-owned and collectively owned 
units has been partly compensated by the increase of employment in the private 
sector, the foreign sector, and new enterprises ownership types5. 
 
Second, the sharp decrease in employment mainly took place in the most competitive 
sectors, such as manufacturing, where the number of employed people dropped by 15 
percent between 1995 and 20026. In contrast, sectors with a state monopoly status 
such as banking and insurance, and real estate increased their employment by 23 
percent and 48 percent respectively over the same period. Third, the regional 
distribution of urban employment and unemployment is also quite uneven. Northeast 
provinces, which have been among the hardest hit provinces by the layoff policy, are 
those that have experienced the sharpest drop in urban employment between 1995 and 
2002 (-28 percent). In other regions, the employment level has remained the same, 
except in the western region where the share of total urban employment increased 
from 18 to 21 percent. 
 
Over the last decade, there has been a large number of works on the changes in 
China’s wage structure.7  This paper analyses labor market segmentation in urban 
China by focusing on earnings differences within three different dimensions: 
enterprises’ ownership, economic sector, and regional location. We use an original 
dataset derived from two urban household surveys conducted by the Chinese 
                                                 
5 These include shareholding corporations, limited liability corporations, cooperative units, and others.  
6 Again, these changes are to be related with the laid-off policy, which has been mainly implemented in 
industries facing strong competition, such as manufacturing and construction. For instance, the number 
of on-post staff and workers in state-owned enterprises in manufacture fell sharply from 33.3 million in 
1995 to 9.8 million in 2002 (NBS 2003, p. 23).  
7 A main area of research analyzes various aspects of labor market segmentation in China, by focusing 
on earnings gaps between different groups of workers: rural migrants and urban residents (Knight et al. 
(1999), Meng and Zhang (2001), Maurer-Fazio and Dinh (2004)), men and women either in rural 
China (Meng and Miller (1995), Meng (1998), Ho et al. (2002), Rozelle et al. (2002), Dong et al. 
(2004)) or in urban China (Qian (1996), Gustafsson and Li 2000, Liu et al. (2000), Hughes and 
Maurer-Fazio (2002), Maurer-Fazio and Hughes (2002), Liu et al. (2004), Bishop et al. (2005), 
Démurger et al. (2007), Ng (2005)) and workers in enterprises of different ownership (Zhao (2001), 
(2002), Dong and Bowles (2002), Chen et al. (2005)). 
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Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), which provide detailed information on labor 
income as well as on individual and household characteristics for urban hukou holders 
in 1995 and 2002. To assess the extent of labor market segmentation, we first estimate 
Mincerian earnings equations for each category of enterprises (defined by ownership, 
sector, or location). We then propose an extended form of Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition methodology to decompose for each dimension the observed earnings 
differentials into three components: the distribution of individual characteristics, 
differences in working time, and what can be interpreted as a pure “segment effect”. 
Comparisons of segmentation magnitudes across ownership, sector, and region, and 
between the two years are expected to provide a broader view on recent changes 
across the various segments of the Chinese urban labor market. 
 
2.  Major reforms in China’s urban labor market 
 
During the pre-reform period, there was virtually no labor market in China. Job 
allocation and wage-settings in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were determined 
within the central plan and a key function held by SOEs was to provide employment 
to the entire working-age population. The main features of this centrally determined 
wage structure were the following8. First, the wage determination system was 
characterized by rigidity with low-level wages and a distribution of wages based on 
an egalitarian principle. Promotion and wage increases were mostly driven by 
seniority. Second, SOEs were not only labor providers, but they also provided a 
number of social welfare benefits, including housing, medical care, pensions, etc., 
which aimed at compensating for low base wages. Third, with the employment 
assignment system and the strictly controlled movement of the population within the 
hukou system, labor mobility across sectors and regions was strongly limited. 
 
Economic reforms launched from the end of the 1970s led to important changes 
within the state sector (Table 1).  In a first step, more autonomy in decision-making 
for employment and wages has been granted to SOEs managers, who were now 
                                                 
8 A detailed description of the pre-reform wage-setting system is given in Meng (2000, chapter 2). See 
also Lin et al. (2001) and Knight and Song (2005). 
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allowed to retain a share of their profit and use it to give bonus wages to their 
employees. Bonus wages aimed to provide incentives to employees and increase the 
overall productivity of SOEs. Their amount was also meant to reflect both enterprise 
and individual performances (Coady and Wang 2000; Meng 2000). However, given 
high supervision costs, bonuses have often been distributed on an egalitarian basis 
within work units, and the evaluation of their impact remains controversial.  
 
The industrial reforms also allowed the emergence of a new private sector, composed 
of domestic private enterprises9, individual enterprises (getihu), domestic joint 
ventures (lianying qiye), foreign-invested enterprises, and share-holding companies 
(gufenzhi qiye). Although domestic private enterprises suffered from restricting 
policies such as overtax, strict regulation, limited access to loans and skilled 
employees in the 1980s, the share of the non-public sector in employment grew 
steadily from 0 in 1978 to 17 percent in 1995, 45 percent in 2002, and 53 percent in 
2004.10   
 
Starting from the mid-1990s, other important changes have taken place on the 
Chinese urban labor market, the most radical being the laid-off policy (xiagang) 
implemented in state-owned and urban collective enterprises, first in Shanghai only in 
1993 and then extended nation-wide in 1997. Given the growing burden of substantial 
redundant labor in the state sector, the goal of this policy was to lay off a quarter or 
more of its workers within 4 years (1997–2000) (Appleton et al. 2002). This policy 
has had a strong impact on employment in the public sector, falling from 112.6 
million in 1995 to 71.6 million in 2002 in SOEs and from 31.5 million to 11.2 million 
in urban collective enterprises.  
 
                                                 
9 In 1988, the State Council issued the Tentative Stipulations on Private Enterprises (TSPE) to govern 
the registration and management of private firms. This document defined a private firm as “a for-profit 
organization that is owned by individuals and employs more than eight people”. Firms that hired eight 
employees or less can be registered as individual enterprises (getihu). The TSPE identified three types 
of private firms: those under sole ownership, partnerships, and limited liability companies. 
10 The Company Law promulgated in November 1993, provided the legal framework for the 
development of limited liability companies and shareholding companies. 
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The second most important change is the wage reform, which was launched in 1994 
and grants enterprises more autonomy in setting wages and bonuses. Consequently, 
the average wage in the state-owned sector has increased substantially, especially in 
the government sector. Between 1998 and 2002, average earnings in state-owned 
units have grown by 107 percent in real terms, with an annual growth rate of 10.9 
percent. However, the wage reform has also widened the earnings gap between 
workers and managers, between skilled workers and unskilled workers, and between 
enterprises making profits and those making losses. During the last two years of Zhu 
Rongji’s administration, salaries in the government sector were raised again by 60 
percent, in order to narrow the income gap between civil servants and white-collar 
workers employed in the non-public sector. 11
 
The last major change on the Chinese urban labor market over 1995-2002 is related to 
rural-urban migration. The policy of city governments for rural migration varies, but 
the general trend is that employment policies concerning rural migrants was tight up 
to the end of the 1990s and started to loosen at the beginning of the new century12. 
The participation of rural migrants in the urban labor market has had a great impact 
on wage levels and unemployment among employees with urban hukou. Rural 
migrant laborers are very competitive against local urban workers for unskilled jobs, 
and this puts pressure on the wage level for unskilled workers on the urban labor 
market, particularly for those whose wage setting is the most strongly related to 
market mechanisms (Cai 2005; Li and Bai 2005).  
 
3.  A first look at the data 
 
3. 1  Data 
The data used in this paper come from two nationally representative household 
income surveys for 1995 and 2002. The surveys are part of the China Household 
                                                 
11 The second objective of this wage adjustment was to stimulate sluggish economic growth. However, 
while the relative wage in the government sector rose significantly, the macroeconomic effect of the 
wage adjustment remained quite limited. 
12 In 1998, the Ministry of Public Security issued new regulations relaxing control over hukou 
registration. In particular, those who join their parents, spouses, and children in cities can now be 
registered with urban hukou (Cai and Wang (2003)). 
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Income Project (CHIP) coordinated by the Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences, with assistance from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). 13 
Household samples were drawn from the large sample used by the NBS. 14 The two 
urban surveys cover the same provinces and cities, and almost the same number of 
households. 15 Although the number of samples in each province is not exactly 
proportional to its actual population, the two figures are highly correlated, more 
households being selected from more populated provinces. The 1995 urban data 
include 6,931 households and 21,694 individuals, and the 2002 urban data 6,835 
households and 20,632 individuals. The distribution of households among provinces 
can be found in Table 2.  
 
The two urban surveys only cover urban hukou holders and thus exclude a potentially 
important segment of the urban labor market: the rural-urban migrants. In a changing 
environment where rural-urban migration is gathering momentum, limiting our study 
to only urban residents might be misleading. We acknowledge this potential 
shortcoming in our study, which does not allow for the evaluation of how migration is 
affecting the urban labor market and wage differentials.  
 
Our sample is restricted to individuals aged 16 to 60 who declared working at least 
part of the year and earning (positive) wages. Owners of private or individual 
enterprises are not considered here since wages cannot be disentangled from profit in 
their case. Laid-off workers are also excluded, which leaves us with a sample of 
10,898 employees in 1995 and 9,537 employees in 2002.  
 
The earnings variable is defined as the sum of cash labor compensations and income 
in kind. Cash labor compensations include the basic salary as well as bonuses, 
                                                 
13 The China Household Income Project is an internationally joint research project established in 1987, 
and sponsored by the Institute of Economics, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the Asian 
Development Bank, and the Ford Foundation. Additional support was provided by the East Asian 
Institute, and Columbia University (Riskin, Zhao, and Li (2000)). Up to now, three household income 
surveys have been conducted--1988, 1995, and 2002. The output of the project based on the first two 
surveys can be found in Griffin and Zhao (1993) and Riskin, Zhao and Li (2001). 
14 The sampling method of NBS is briefly explained in NBS 2002, p.318.  
15 The 11 provinces included in the urban survey are Anhui, Beijing, Gansu, Guangdong, Henan, 
Hubei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shanxi, Sichuan, and Yunnan.  
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allowances (except those given while “waiting for a job”, xiagang) and subsidies 
(including housing, medical, childcare, and regional subsidies), other wages 
(including overtime wages and wages for special circumstances), and other income 
from work unit (except hardship allowances). Hence, our earnings variable includes 
some non-monetary benefits (e.g. housing, medical care, child care, and regional 
subsidies), although it does not fully account for all fringe benefits provided by the 
public sector (such as implicit contribution to pensions, health insurance, or 
preferential housing rents). Finally, hourly earnings are defined as the ratio between 
earnings and the number of declared hours worked in a year.  
 
An important component of earnings differentials in China may lie on differences in 
living standards between different cities. To account at least partially for this factor, 
earnings are adjusted for provincial purchasing power differences by using Brandt and 
Holz (2006) urban provincial-level spatial price deflators (the reference being 
nationwide prices in 2002). In the analysis presented below, earnings are thus 
expressed in “inter-provincial purchasing power parity”, which we believe can be 
considered as more comparable than non-deflated data usually considered in the 
literature. Among the consequences of using this purchasing power parity adjustment 
is that it leads to a reduction in earnings differentials between some regions as 
compared to the official NBS China Statistical Yearbooks data16. It is especially the 
case for the comparison between municipalities and other regions, since the cost of 
living in municipalities is much higher. 
 
We focus on the evolution of earnings differentials in various components of the labor 
market, and consider three different dimensions, namely ownership, economic sector, 
and geographical location, for each of which, we define several categories.  
 
Five categories of enterprise ownership are considered: state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs); urban collective enterprises (UCEs); private enterprises (PIEs); foreign-
invested enterprises (FIEs); and government agencies or institutions (GAIs). In the 
                                                 
16 See Démurger et al. (2006) for an evaluation of the impact of using deflators on measures of spatial 
inequality.  
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course of the 1995-02 period, new categories of enterprises have emerged, notably 
share-holding corporations (from both the state and others). In our definition of state-
owned enterprises, SOEs at the central or provincial level are included as well as local 
publicly owned enterprises, and for 2002, state share-holding companies. Private 
enterprises comprise private or individual enterprises, and for 2002, other share-
holding companies. 
 
Economic sectors are categorized according to their openness to competition, and are 
grouped into four categories: competitive sectors, oligopolistic sectors, public 
services, and government agencies. The competitive sectors are manufacturing, 
construction, commerce and trade, and food services. The oligopolistic sectors are real 
estate, public utilities, and finance and insurance. Real estate17 is considered as 
“oligopolistic” for two reasons. First, there are huge structural barriers to entry in this 
sector, because it requires a large amount of investment. Second, access to land in 
China is quite closely related to relationship with the government at any level. Both 
public utilities and finance and insurance are considered oligopolistic sectors because 
they were not (or hardly) open to the private sector in 2002.  
 
The third economic sector considered here (“public services”) includes health care, 
sport and social welfare, education, culture and arts, and scientific research. We 
separate public services from government agencies in the sector dimension because 
they are different in terms of wage settings. Indeed, while government agencies’ 
wages are paid only by the government, public services can get additional funding 
from the market, which may substantially affect wage settings behaviors.  
 
Some economic sectors (mining, geological prospecting and irrigation administration; 
transportation, storage, post office, and communication; and for social services) could 
not be clearly classified as defined above. We omitted these sectors from our analysis. 
                                                 
17 There is some inconsistency for the definition of “real estate” between 1995 and 2002. Indeed, in 
1995, “real estate” also includes “social services” (such as law companies, housekeepers, 
reemployment centers, etc.) while in 2002, they are split into two separate categories. We chose not to 
add-up these two categories for 2002 since social services are mostly competitive. However, we 
believe that the bias of including social services into real estate in 1995 should not be too large since 
this sector was still marginal in 1995. 
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 For the third dimension, regional location, we have five regions: coast, center, west, 
northeast, and metropolises. As the household income surveys do not cover all 
Chinese provinces, the five regions are represented by a sub-sample of provinces. 
Beijing is representative of province-level metropolitan cities. Guangdong and 
Jiangsu are representatives of coastal provinces. Henan, Anhui, Hubei, and Shanxi are 
representatives of central provinces. Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan are representatives 
of western provinces, and Liaoning is representative of northeastern provinces.18
 
Ideally, we would like to consider the three dimensions highlighted above 
simultaneously since they are obviously correlated. Among the most prominent 
correlations, Table 3 shows that 1) oligopolistic sectors mostly consist of SOEs and 
GAIs, 2) private and foreign enterprises are mainly found in the competitive sector as 
well as in the coastal region, and 3) SOEs are over-represented in the northeast region. 
However, for practical reasons, it is not possible to consider the three dimensions 
together. This is because the methodology requires the estimation of earnings 
equations by sub-categories, and if we were to consider each sub-category (e.g. SOEs 
in the competitive sector in the coastal region) we would have too few observations. 
Consequently, in the following analysis, the three dimensions will be analyzed 
separately, though keeping in mind that they are overlapping. 
 
The main characteristics of employees by dimension and over time are shown in 
Tables 4, 5, and 6. A first general comment on the evolution between 1995 and 2002 
is that both average age and education level have increased over time, while the share 
of long-term contracts has sharply decreased from 96 percent to below 80 percent.  
 
                                                 
18 For our purpose, it is more appropriate to consider Liaoning’s characteristics as representative of a 
fifth category of provinces, namely northeastern provinces rather than coastal provinces. Indeed, 
Liaoning province is quite different from coastal provinces in terms of industrial and ownership 
structure. Its industrial structure is strongly influenced by strategic choices that have been made during 
the central planning period, with a predominance of heavy industry sectors, and thus central SOEs. 
Moreover, it has been one of the most badly hit provinces by the laid-off policy from the end of the 
1990s, which has had strong implications in terms of employment structure. 
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Comparisons by ownership (Table 4) show that government agencies and foreign-
invested enterprises employ better-educated workers than other sectors in 1995 and 
2002. As compared with private and foreign sectors, workers in the public sector are 
older and more often party members, with long-term tenure, but they are less likely to 
be located in coastal provinces. It is noteworthy that the most educated workers are 
found in public administration, with an average number of years of education (above 
12) much higher than in any other type of enterprise for 1995 and 2002. Finally, the 
regional distribution of the private sector has equalized over time, which may reflect 
the development of the private sector at the turn of the century all over China, 
including inland provinces.  
 
As for differences by sectors (Table 5), employees in the competitive sector are less 
likely to be educated (especially in 2002), party members, and working in SOEs. They 
are also less likely to have long-term contracts in 2002. Consistent with the ownership 
dimension, we can observe that it is in public services and in government agencies 
that the level of education is the highest.  
 
Finally, regional differences (Table 6) show that workers in municipalities tend to 
have much better characteristics than in other regions in terms of education, 
experience (higher age), and party membership (for 1995). On the contrary, workers 
in coastal provinces are less educated and less likely to be party members (with a 
lower share of SOEs), which may be consistent with the non-skilled labor-intensive 
outward-oriented light industrial structure of these provinces. For the Northeast region, 
the downsizing of the state-owned sector has been particularly large between 1995 
and 2002; the share of SOEs employment of 63 percent in 2002 is the lowest across 
regions.  The share of employees with long-term contracts has also dropped most 
radically in the northeast, from the highest in 1995 (nearly 98 percent) to the lowest in 
2002 (64 percent). 
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3. 2  The evolution of earnings differentials by categories 
Descriptive statistics on earnings differentials and earnings composition across the 
three dimensions are given in Tables 7, 8, and 919.  In terms of ownership (Table 7), 
workers at government agencies and institutions have gained a lot, with a doubling in 
earnings. This huge increase resulted in a changing sign of the observed earnings 
differential with foreign-invested enterprises in 2002. Hence, while foreign-invested 
enterprises were providing the highest total earnings in 1995, the huge earnings 
increase in government agencies and institutions moved them up to the first rank with 
wages similar to foreign-invested enterprises in 200220. On the other hand, urban 
collective enterprises as well as private and individual enterprises have seen their 
relative position deteriorating, the largest gap with other enterprises jumping from 67 
to 78 percent and 57 to 64 percent respectively between 1995 and 2002.  
 
In terms of economic sectors (Table 8), the difference between the competitive and 
the non-competitive sectors (oligopolistic, public services, and government) has 
turned larger over time, with the earnings gap in favor of non-competitive sectors 
increasing from a range of 10 - 17 percent to 48 - 63 percent. A somehow similar 
change, with much lower amplitude though, has also taken place across non-
competitive sectors, with the largest gap between two non-competitive sectors 
increasing from 6 percent in 1995 to 10 percent in 2002.  
 
Furthermore, coefficients of variation (c.v.) on total earnings indicate a more 
equitable distribution of earnings in the public sector (SOEs and GAIs) as compared 
to the private/competitive sectors for both years. The earnings composition has also 
changed over time, the most notable change being the sharp reduction in the share of 
subsidies provided by SOEs (which comes from a 50 percent reduction of the absolute 
amount in SOEs). Consequently, while the public sector was offering much higher 
                                                 
19 All the data discussed in the remaining of this paper are deflated, using Brandt and Holz (2006) 
urban provincial-level spatial price deflators as explained above. 
20 The observed difference in 2002 is not statistically significant. 
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subsidies than the private sector in 1995, it is no longer the case in 2002, except in 
public administration21. 
 
At the beginning of economic reform, the earnings difference between coastal 
provinces and inner provinces was extremely small.22   Then, as indicated in Knight et 
al. (2001), a significant divergence in earnings growth across provinces in urban areas 
arose between 1988 and 1995. Our data (Table 9) indicate that no further divergence 
across the different geographical regions can be observed between 1995 and 2002 
when earnings are adjusted by regional living costs.  The relative differences between 
coastal provinces and central and western provinces were slightly reduced over the 
period, but the premium offered by the former still stands at 37 percent compared 
with central provinces and 28 percent compared with western provinces. The 
comparison between municipalities and other regions shows that taking account of 
differences in living costs sharply lowers the premium in favor of municipalities, 
especially compared with coastal provinces. 
 
Lastly, the comparison of the number of hours worked per week shows a longer 
working time in the private sector than in the public sector for the two years, despite a 
reduction in the number of hours worked in both private or individual enterprises and 
foreign-invested enterprises in 2002. The comparison across economic sectors 
confirms that workers in public services and in government agencies work less, but it 
also shows that working time in the competitive sector has increased over time while 
it has decreased in the oligopolistic sector, leading to a quite important gap between 
competitive and non-competitive sectors in 2002 (about 4 hours per week). Regional 
comparisons do not reveal strong differences in working time across regions, except 
for a sizeable reduction in hours worked in municipalities between 1995 and 2002, 
which is not observed in other regions. 
                                                 
21 In 1995, there were still some institutional limitations on wage settings. This can be seen clearly 
from basic wages, which were quite similar across different sectors with the main determinants of 
earnings differences being income outside basic wage. 
22 In fact, average earnings in the western region were even higher than that in the coastal region. For 
instance, in 1978, it was 696 yuan in the eight western provinces (Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, 
Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang) and 666 yuan in the eight coastal provinces (Tianjin, Liaoning, 
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, and Guangdong) (NBS 1999, p.139).   
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 4. Methodology 
 
In order to analyze earnings differentials between individuals belonging to different 
segments in the labor market (across ownership, sector, or region), we use an 
extended version of Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973) to 
evaluate the contribution of three complementary factors: differences in mean 
endowments of workers across segments, differences in hours worked, and a pure 
“segment effect”.  
 
4. 1  Modeling total earnings 
Let is  represent hourly earnings for individual i belonging to segment s. 
i
s  depends
on two sets of arguments: individual characteristics ( is ), and a set of segment specific 
parameters corresponding to the earnings model linking individual characteristics 
with observed earnings ( ). 
w w  
to segment s.  also depends on two sets of arguments: individual and household 
characteri rmining labor supply ( ), and a set of segment specific 
parameters ( ). 
         (2) 
The total d as: 
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4. 2  Decomposition of observed earnings differentials 
Using equation (3), the observed average earnings gap between two segments s and S 
can be decomposed as follows: 
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 worked effect. 
i) If workers observed in different categories were facing the same conditions in the 
ed with the same characteristics, the 
gs 
 used to predict hourly earnings and 
hours worked for each individual and each segment. Third, each of the effects 
ng 
 to 
. The 
years of education; a dummy variable if the individual has received vocational 
(4) 
This decomposition provides an evaluation of what would be the observed average 
earnings gap under the following c
i) If workers observed in different categories were facing the same conditions in the 
determination of remuneration and of hours worked, the wage difference reflects pur
difference-in-endowments effect. 
ii) If workers observed in different categories were facing the same conditions in the 
determination of remuneration and were endowed with the same characteristics, the 
wage difference reflects pure difference-in-hours
ii
determination of hours worked and were endow
wage difference reflects pure “segment effect”. 
 
4. 3  Implementation and robustness issues 
The practical implementation of the method consists of three steps. First, earnin
equations and hours worked equations are estimated separately for each segment (see 
Appendix). Second, estimated coefficients are
presented in equation (4) is evaluated by averaging over individuals the correspondi
observed or counter-factual earnings values.  
 
4. 3. 1  Earnings equations  Decomposition results presented below correspond
the specification for earnings equation estimations detailed in Appendix A and B
common explanatory variables for hourly earnings functions are effective number of 
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education; effective years of work experience and the square of this variable; a 
dummy variable for “big cities”; and a dummy variable for acquisition of the current 
rban residence permit (hukou). Regional dummies are used as additional explanatory 
 
 
uring has led to a selective laying-off of workers. 
Our dynamic interpretations in terms of segmentation changes might thus be partly 
 
ctor 
idered 
d on 
rocedure (estimation, simulation, and decomposition).25 The following 
decomposition tables include the corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals.  
 
                                                
u
variables in the ownership and sector dimensions.  
 
Selectivity bias in enterprise type and industrial sector choices may affect the 
estimated coefficients from earnings equations and thus decomposition results. In the
absence of any credible exogenous instrument in the data, we proceeded without 
corrections for selection bias. In any case, our decomposition findings are robust to 
changes in both specification and estimation methods. 23  However, it should be 
stressed that, although labor has been administratively allocated in China up to 1995
and labor mobility remained quite low until this date, selection may definitely be a 
more important issue in 2002.  While the development of labor market has allowed 
mobility to increase, SOE-restruct
driven by selection mechanisms.  
 
4. 3. 2  Decomposition: path-dependence  A general issue concerning Oaxaca-
Blinder decompositions concerns path-dependence (Fournier 2005). Indeed, evaluated
effects a priori depend on the benchmark population structure or coefficient ve
chosen to run micro-simulations. In our work, each possible evaluation is cons
and used as a robustness test for our decomposition results24. Moreover, since 
decomposition results obtained from this type of analyses strongly depen
estimation quality, a bootstrap procedure has been implemented over the whole 
p
 
23 In particular, results obtained through the two-step method proposed by Dubin and McFadden 
(1984), with sector choice and enterprise choice modeled as multinomial Logit and local shares of 
employment in various sectors used as instruments, led to similar results for all aspects considered in 
this paper. 
24 Each effect can be evaluated in six different ways, depending on the choice of reference populations 
and coefficient vectors as well as on the choice of the sequence in which different effects are evaluated. 
25 By resampling from the original data, the nonparametric boostrap method allows for the derivation of 
confidence intervals for all statistics obtained through the microsimulation procedure presented above. 
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5.  Decomposing the evolution of earnings differentials by categories 
 
Tables 10, 11, and 12 document the changes in relative remunerations across 
enterprises of different ownership/sector/region in urban China, by applying the 
extended Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method presented above. Differentials are 
reported both in mean value and in percentage of the lowest earnings, the stars 
indicating the statistical significance of estimated effects. For example, the 
“Endowment effect” figures reported on the first row of Table 10 read as follows. Of 
the 1,299 yuan observed average earnings gap between SOEs and UCEs in 1995, 352 
yuan can be attributed to better characteristics observed in SOEs, which would lead, 
other things equal, to a 7 percent average earnings gap against UCEs (instead of the 
27 percent observed differential).26  
 
5. 1  Ownership structure 
In the first column of Table 10, observed earnings differences across enterprises of 
various ownership show a general increasing trend between 1995 and 2002, the only 
(noteworthy) exception being between FIEs and GAIs27. The evolution has been in 
favor of both FIEs and GAIs, and at the expense of UCEs. In the middle, employees 
in SOEs have seen their earnings gap increased compared to UCEs, but their situation 
has deteriorated compared to GAIs. The most striking result from Table 10 is the 
growing importance (and significance) of segmentation as the most prominent 
explanatory factor for the general increasing trend in earnings differences across 
ownership.  
 
Earnings differentials in favor of the foreign sector in 1995 have increased over time 
compared to the emerging domestic private sector, but decreased compared to the 
public sector. The deteriorating position of FIEs as compared to GAIs mainly comes 
from changing segmentation patterns (from 14 percent in favor of FIEs to a non-
significant 5 percent in favor of GAIs), although a higher working time in FIEs gives 
                                                 
26 Both figures are statistically significant at the 5 percent level as shown by corresponding confidence 
intervals provided under the “5%” and “95%” headings. 
27 The FIE-GAI gap vanished from 22 percent in favor of FIEs in 1995 to a low and non-significant 2 
percent in favor of GAIs. 
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them a premium over GAIs (5 percent). Compared to SOEs, the observed decrease in 
earnings differential mainly comes from decreasing segmentation in favor of FIEs 
(from 23 percent to 16 percent). A stronger segmentation in favor of FIEs can be 
found when compared to UCEs and PIEs. The earnings gap between FIEs and UCEs 
(67 - 74 percent) comes from the conjunction of a strong and increasing segmentation 
(40 - 51 percent), better characteristics (17 - 20 percent) and a longer (although 
reducing) working time in FIEs. For the comparison with PIEs, figures for 1995 must 
be taken with caution since estimations do not perform very well for this year, and the 
number of observations in this particular category are small (see Appendices A1 and 
B1). However, it is instructive to examine earnings differentials in 2002. The 
comparison with FIEs shows a strong segmentation: the premium in favor of FIEs 
would be 65 percent in 2002 if there were no differences in characteristics and hours 
worked with PIEs. However, longer working time in PIEs reduces the gap by 11 
percentage points on average. 
 
In 1995, the earnings differential between the public sector and urban collectives was 
all in favor of the former (27 percent for SOEs and 37 percent for GAIs), and was 
explained by the conjunction of both better endowments of workers in the public 
sector and a rather strong segmentation against urban collectives (respectively 17 and 
27 percent). Interestingly, the huge increase in the earnings gap between GAIs and 
UCEs over time (reaching 78 percent in 2002) can be attributed to a much stronger 
segmentation (65 percent) but also, and rather importantly, to a widening gap in terms 
of workers endowments, with an increase of the wage premium due to better 
characteristics from 9 percent to 18 percent. On the opposite, changes in hours 
worked are reducing the gap in 2002 between UCEs and both SOEs and GAIs, but 
with quite a small impact (respectively 3 percent and 6 percent).  
 
In 2002, the comparison between PIEs and the public sector also shows high earnings 
differentials against PIEs, the premium in favor of the public sector ranging from 31 
percent to 64 percent. Again, these gaps are driven by a strong segmentation 
phenomenon (50 - 78 percent), which cannot be compensated by longer hours worked 
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in the private sector though this last effect is quite high and significant (18 - 21 
percent).  
 
The decomposition analysis presented here highlights three main phenomena on the 
ownership dimension, which are of importance to understand the evolution of the 
labor market in urban China. First, workers in the public sector, especially 
government agencies and institutions, are still very much privileged as compared to 
other segments of the labor market. Second, the foreign sector has reinforced its 
position through a sustained high wage policy. Third, the emerging domestic private 
sector and the collective sector have seen their relative position deteriorating. These 
results show that despite the increasing importance of market mechanisms within the 
private sector, active policies launched at the end of the 1990s to raise government 
wages have had a strong impact in terms of segmentation, which confirms that 
earnings in the public sector remain highly protected. It should be stressed that there 
might also be a sizeable selection effect at stake here since the downsizing of the state 
sector has led to the privatization of the least dynamic enterprises, the Chinese 
authorities still controlling large profit-making SOEs where employees remain 
strongly protected. 
 
5. 2  Economic sectors 
The decomposition results by economic sectors presented in Table 11 also highlight 
quite a strong and rising segmentation between competitive and protected sectors. In 
1995, segmentation against the competitive sectors contributed to more than half of 
the total average earnings differences. In 2002, the main reason why the competitive 
sectors provided much lower wages than the rest of the sectors (between 48 percent 
and 63 percent) almost exclusively comes from the segmentation effect, which is 
strongly reinforced as compared to 1995, and ranges from 50 percent to 64 percent.  
 
By the end of the 1990s, SOEs began to retreat from the competitive sector, while 
strengthening their position in non-competitive sectors, especially in the oligoplistic 
sector. SOEs downsizing and massive lay-offs are the main reasons for the surge in 
unemployment at the end of the 1990s, but our decompositions indicate no change in 
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terms of the relative wage level for the remaining employees in the oligopolistic 
sector. The comparison between the competitive sector and the oligopolistic sector 
even reveals no significant differences in workers’ characteristics, the only 
determinant explaining the large difference being the segmentation effect.  
 
These findings can be analyzed in terms of profit sharing within oligopolistic sectors 
(Li and Bai 2005; Knight and Li 2005). Moreover, institutional explanations lie in the 
increased autonomy in wage settings and increased wages for civil servants provided 
by the Chinese government over the period. This has allowed the oligopolistic sector 
and public services to redistribute rents to employees, while the competitive sector 
has been facing growing competition. 
 
Not only the wage level, but also working hours have changed under the pressure of 
competition. During the period, working time has increased in the competitive sectors 
while at the same time, the non-competitive sectors somewhat reduced their working 
hours. Given this differentiated evolution, changes in hours worked are partly hiding 
the magnitude of the evolution. Indeed, if workers in the competitive sectors were not 
working longer, the observed differences of 48 percent to 63 percent would be even 
larger by 8 to 10 percentage points. Hence, if there were no segmentation and only 
differences in the hours worked, the earnings level for similar workers in competitive 
sectors would be higher than the oligopolistic sectors, and quite close to public 
services and government jobs. 
 
Within the non-competitive sector, observed earnings differences also turned larger in 
2002. For both years, endowments in the oligopolistic sector are slightly lower than in 
the other two sectors. This is especially the case for the comparison with public 
services, in which endowments (9 - 5 percent) are significantly higher than in the 
oligopolistic sector and drive a major part of the observed earnings gap (6 - 10 
percent). Antithetically, public services show small endowment differences with the 
government sector in 1995, but benefit from a favorable segmentation effect (6 
percent), which turned even larger in 2002 (13 percent). This somewhat surprising 
segmentation phenomenon may be explained by the fact that in public services, wages 
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are derived partly from the government, and partly from the market. The 
marketization of this sector has allowed workers in public services to get rising extra 
wage income (bonus, subsidy, etc.) on top of wages provided by the government.  
 
The sector decomposition confirms and completes some of the findings from the 
ownership analysis, with a rising segmentation over 1995-02 in favor of the non-
competitive sectors. Three facts can be highlighted here to explain observed earnings 
differences and evolutions over the period studied: 1) increasing competition within 
the competitive sector; 2) increasing concentration of large SOEs within oligopolistic 
sectors; and 3) increasing protection of government jobs. 
 
5. 3  Regional segmentation 
Consistent with the findings in the other two dimensions, regional decompositions 
show a trend of rising segmentation (Table 12). Regional disparities, especially 
between coastal provinces and other regions remain large, the highest gap still being  
close to 40 percent in 2002. A sizeable part of the observed earnings gap between 
regions can be attributed to a more rapid economic growth and huge capital inflow in 
the coastal region, and to inadequate labor mobility between regions. As illustrated in 
many studies (e.g. Knight and Yueh 2006), labor mobility is still limited for urban 
local workers subject to various institutional obstacles even at the end of 1990s, while 
regional mobility among rural migrant workers increased over time. 
 
Table 12 shows that the share of regional differences resulting from segmentation, 
particularly between coastal region and other regions, is remarkably large in the two 
years and became stronger in almost each pair of regions.  Segmentation explains the 
major part of the observed earnings difference between the coastal and central region 
(35 - 41 percent), between the coastal and western region (28 percent), and between 
the coastal and northeast region (40 - 41 percent).  
 
A remarkable change between 1995 and 2002 is the deteriorating relative position of 
central provinces. This change may be rooted in the fact that the region has been 
disregarded in the strategy of regional development of the central government. 
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However, despite declining relative earnings and increasing segmentation against 
workers in the region, central provinces have improved their relative position in terms 
of endowment in 2002. All endowment effects against central provinces in 1995 
(ranging from 2 to 15 percent) reversed or became no longer significant in 2002. This 
may be because skilled and well-educated laid-off workers from closed SOEs had to 
take jobs that were previously filled by unskilled and poorly educated workers. The 
better-endowed people remained active while low-endowed people were forced to exit 
the labor market.  
 
On the opposite, the position of the western region in terms of segmentation has 
improved somewhat between 1995 and 2002. One possible interpretation is that the 
Western Development Strategy has raised the relative level of earnings in western 
provinces, allowing then to maintain their relative position with respect to coastal 
provinces ( around 30 percent earnings gap) in a context of growing regional 
segmentation. 
 
The northeastern provinces, represented by Liaoning, deserve special attention. The 
relative earnings in the northeast region slightly decreased compared to other regions 
except municipalities between 1995 and 2002, which is reflected in rising observed 
earnings gaps between the northeast region and other regions. Concerning 
segmentation phenomena, the evidence is mixed: stable segmentation in favor of 
coastal provinces (40 - 41 percent), western provinces (10 - 11 percent), and 
municipalities (17 - 20 percent) on one hand, and decreasing segmentation in favor of 
central provinces (7 percent in 1995 to non-significant in 2002) on the other hand. 
This pattern can be at least partly explained by a declining endowment effect against 
the northeast region due to selection mechanisms. With the massive lay-offs and 
closures of some large scale enterprises, the absence of local re-employment 
opportunities caused better educated employees (e.g. professionals, technician and 
skilled workers) to move to other provinces.  
 
Regional decompositions provide further evidence of rising segmentation on China’s 
urban labor market and complement the other two dimensions by highlighting quite 
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large regional disparities and the unequal distribution of gains or burdens related to 
changes in the labor market at the turn of the century. They also stress the importance 
of the Chinese government’s regional policies in alleviating burdens in some regions 
(e.g. western provinces) and redistributing the benefits of economic development. In 
this context, central provinces appear to be by far the greatest (relative) looser in the 
recent reform process, facing increasing segmentation, even as compared to western 
and northeastern provinces. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper analyzes the evolution of labor market segmentation for urban hukou 
holders between 1995 and 2002. During the 7-year period, real earnings in urban 
China have increased sharply (+78 percent) and for all workers, with substantial 
differences across ownership and sectors, and to a lesser extent, regions. As a result, 
earnings differentials across enterprises have changed dramatically and sometimes 
induced a re-ranking. 
 
Our decomposition results show strong evidence of a multi-tiered labor market along 
three major lines, segmentation arising across enterprise ownership (up to 78 percent), 
economic sectors (up to 64 percent), and regions (up to 41 percent). They also 
highlight increasing segmentation over time within each of these three dimensions. In 
particular, the gap between the privileged segments of the labor market (e.g. SOEs 
and oligopolitistic sectors) and the most competitive segments (e.g. private enterprises 
and competitive sectors) has widened between 1995 and 2002. Our results confirm the 
Knight and Song (2003) findings that “the market forces operating in the growing 
private sector and the relative immunity of the state sector from those forces 
generated greater wage segmentation among types of ownership [between 1995 and 
1999], and provincial differences in the place of reform and in economic growth 
created spatial segmentation in wages that could not be removed by the equilibrating 
movement of labor” (Knight and Song 2003, 616). 
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In the view of the massive layoffs in the state-owned sector at the end of the 1990s 
and the concomitant impressive growth of the private sector, one might have expected 
segmentation not to increase so sharply given the growing importance of market 
mechanisms and competition in the urban labor market. However, the clear distinction 
found between a “protected” well-paying segment and a “competitive” segment 
mostly made of the emerging private sector stresses a strongly segmented labor 
market in 2002. More specifically, our findings suggest that there are two directions 
toward which the urban labor market in China is moving. On one hand, economic 
liberalization has brought various benefits to the labor system, including better signals 
for a more efficient allocation of labor and improved incentives for efforts thanks to 
enhanced rewards to effort. On the other hand, various institutional as well as market-
based elements have prevented equalization of marginal products, and thus reduction 
in earning differences. Major explanations for the strong and rising magnitude of 
segmentation between 1995-02 can be found in migration restrictions and in active 
government policies towards the public sector, but certainly in efficiency-wage 
related behavior in the foreign sector. 
 
The observed increasing spatial segmentation reflects the still extremely low mobility 
of labor among urban dwellers, which represents a major obstacle to the formation of 
competitive market wages in urban areas. Even though regional mobility for rural-
urban migrant workers has increased over time and the effectiveness of institutional 
barriers such as the hukou system has progressively declined, various institutional 
obstacles remained to labor mobility for urban residents even at the end of the 1990s. 
As a result, market mechanisms favoring wages convergence could not operate 
properly. The evidence found here supports Knight and Song (2005) findings of a 
“three tier” labor market in 1999, which consists of “privileged” urban residents never 
made redundant during the SOEs downsizing process, retrenched urban workers, and 
rural-urban migrants. The upper segment is employees in the public sector and/or the 
oligopolistic sectors, while the second segment is consistent with a more competitive 
private sector characterized by short-term contracts and by downward pressures on 
wages coming from the third segment (the rural-urban migrants). It must be 
remembered that our empirical analysis is only based on data collected for urban 
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hukou holders, i.e. local urban residents. Consequently, it does not encompass the 
whole labor market in cities where huge inflows of rural-urban migrants are 
potentially key components of the urban labor market.  
 
Contrary to European economies in transition, where studies found a wage premium 
in favor of the private sector after economic liberalization (Adamchick and Bedi 
2000; Lokshin and Jovanovic 2003), our results highlight earnings differences in 
favor of the public sector in China after controlling for workers’ characteristics and 
working time. Hence, even during the most recent period, the Chinese government 
has kept its influence on the urban labor market through wage income increases for 
civil servants and by maintaining the relative income of workers in SOEs, as well as 
by targeting specific provinces. Compared to European economies in transition, the 
Chinese government has taken active policies through wage adjustments to narrow the 
income gap between civil servants and white-collar workers employed in the non-
public sector and thus keep skilled workers in the public sector. In this respect, the 
observed segmentation structure helps the public sector to retain skilled workers. It 
also reduces incentives for moonlighting and thus compromises the overall efficiency 
of the public sector, which have been observed in Poland or Yugoslavia (Adamchick 
and Bedi 2000; Lokshin and Jovanovic 2003). 
 
The existence of segmentation in the labor market may also be interpreted in terms of 
efficiency wage theory, especially for the comparison between FIEs and domestic 
(public and private) enterprises, and to some extent between coastal provinces and 
other regions. In this line of thought, higher earnings received in FIEs may be 
interpreted as means to facilitate workers’ cooperation, to boost their effort-intensity, 
and more generally, to improve the average quality of job applicants. Since FIEs in 
China face greater difficulties in employee supervision due to language barriers and 
cultural differences, they may be willing to pay wages above market rates to solve 
part of these difficulties and to protect their investment in employees’ screening, 
hiring, and training. Following this approach, economic liberalization and growing 
market participation may be consistent with the payment of wages exceeding a pure 
competitive level.  
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 If these two last points may provide some economic rationale to high and even rising 
segmentation, increasing segmentation associated to a non-uniform move of 
enterprises toward the payment of competitive market wages may yield further 
sources of income inequality. Indeed, evidence shows that during the 7-year period, 
the structure of wages has become more unequal.28 As highlighted by Khan and 
Riskin (2005), the concentration ratio for urban wages increased by 68 percent 
between 1995 and 2002. Our results confirm this trend and the potential perverted 
effects of a multi-tiered urban labor market on income inequality.  
 
Finally, there are good reasons to believe that the observed increasing segmentation 
may be only a temporary phenomenon. Indeed, given the process of SOEs 
downsizing, ownership structure may lose importance in the end. At the same time, 
the growing importance of the private sector might be expected to put more pressure 
on the urban labor market in the future by bringing in stronger competition and 
challenging the privileged situation of employees in the public and oligopolistic 
sectors. Similarly, population movements across provinces and regions are also on the 
rise and may re-balance regional disparities in the end. 
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Table 1 – Main steps in China’s urban labor market reform 
 
1978 Introduction of a retirement system in urban areas (60 years old for men / 50 years 
old for women with no less 10 years of working experience).29
1979 Reintroduction of bonuses and piece wages to improve labor productivity. 
1982 Encouragement of development of self-employment and individual firms30. 
1983 Introduction of the labor contract system to cover new entrants into state and 
collective sectors.31
Introduction of a “job–holding without pay” scheme. 
1984 More authority given to enterprises to determine wage and introduction of a floating 
wage system linked to enterprise performance and profitability. 32
1986 New regulations promulgated, including Temporary Regulations on Labor Contract 
System of State-owned Enterprises, Temporary Regulations on Dismissal of 
Lawbreaking Worker in State-owned Enterprises, Temporary Regulations on State-
owned Enterprises Workers, Temporary Regulations on State-owned Enterprises 
Recruitment of Workers, Temporary Regulations on Laid-off Workers of State-owned 
Enterprises.  
Law enabling enterprises to lay-off employees. 
Launching of an unemployment insurance scheme (July). 
1987 New regulations on fixed-term contracts, calling for the extension of contracts to 
incumbent workers. 
1990 Restrictions on migration of rural labor force to reduce employment pressure in 
urban areas.33
1991 Reform of the pension system.34
1992 Labor Union Law (April).  
More authority given to state-owned enterprises in the manufacturing sector in terms 
of recruitment and lay-off of workers as well as in setting wages and bonuses.35
1993 Regulations on Reallocation of Surplus Staff and Workers of State-Owned 
Enterprises, to define layoff (xiagang) conditions (firing procedures, amount of 
retired money, etc.). 
Regulations on the Minimum Wage of State-Owned Enterprises (November). 
1994 Regulations on bankruptcy of state-owned enterprises and setting-up of re-
employment centers.36
Introduction of rules on interregional movement of rural labor force, including a 
                                                 
29 See State Council’s Provisional Measures for Retirement and Quit of Workers, issued on June 2, 
1978.  
30 Sixth Five-Year Plan of China Economic and Social Development, ratified by the People’s Congress 
on December 10, 1982.  
31 See Statement of the Ministry of Personnel and Labor on Active Implementation of Labor Contract, 
issued on February 22, 1983. 
32 The Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party’s Resolution on Economic Institutional Reform, 
issued on October 20, 1984. 
33 See State Council’s Notice on Effective Work for Urban Employment, issued on April 27, 1990.  
34 See State Council’s Resolution on Reform of Pension System for Enterprise Workers, issued on June 
26, 1991. 
35 See Regulations on Transform of Operation Mechanism of State-owned Industrial Enterprises, 
issued by the State Council on July 23, 1992. 
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number of cards such as the Employment Card and the Temporary Resident Card. 37  
Regulations on Wage Control of Joint-Stock Companies (December). 
1995 Labor Law of the PRC (effective on Jan. 1st), making labor contracts mandatory in all 
industrial enterprises, including TVEs. 
Working time legally set at no more than eight hours a day and no more than 44 
hours a week on average in the state sector.38
Implementation of the re-employment project, providing preferential policy for firms 
employing unemployed workers and surplus laborers.39
1997 Acceleration in the implementation of the laid-off policy.40   
1998 Introduction of new re-employment policies such as encouraging development of 
private and individual enterprises, tax exemptions for firms employing laid-off 
workers.41
Regulations issued by the Ministry of Public Security to loosen the control on hukou 
registration. 
1999 Regulations on Unemployment Insurance, to help transform the laid-off subsidy 
system into an unemployment insurance system. 
Regulations on Security of Minimum Livelihood for Urban Residents, to provide 
income program for poor urban households (September). 
2000 More authority given to enterprises in wage setting and allowing managers to set 
higher wage for themselves.42
Provisional Regulations on Collective Negotiation in Wage Setting (issued by 
MOLSS, November). 
2001 Pilot implementation of the New Social Security Scheme in some cities.43
2003 Drop of some restrictions to rural-urban migration, including abolishment of various 
cards and fees charged on migrant workers. 44
 
Sources: Cai (2005), Fleisher and Yang (2003), Meng (2000), MOLSS and Literature Research Office 
of CCCPC (2002), Zhang et al. (2005). 
                                                                                                                                            
36 See State Council’s Notice on Some Issues Related to Trial Implementation of Bankruptcy for State-
owned Enterprises in Selected Cities, November 25, 1994.  
37 See Provisional Regulations on Employment of Rural Labor Force between Provinces, issued by the 
Ministry of Labor, November 17, 1994.  
38 See State Council’s Regulations on Work Time of Workers, issued on March 25, 1995. 
39 See Report of the Ministry of Labor on Implementation of the Re-employment Project, Submitted to 
the State Council on March 27, 1995.  
40 See State Council’s Complementary Notice on Some Issues Related to Trial Implementation of 
Merge and Bankruptcy for State-owned Enterprises and Re-employment of Workers in Selected Cities, 
March 2, 1997. 
41 See CCCPC and State Council’s Notice on Security of Basic Livelihood of Laid-off Workers from 
State-owned Enterprises and Emphasis on Re-employment, June 9, 1998. 
42 See Guidelines for Further Deepening Distribution System in Enterprises, issued by the MOLSS, 
November 6, 2000. 
43 See State Council’s Complementary Notice on Pilot Plan for Perfecting Social Security System in 
Urban Areas, December 25, 2000.  
44 See Notice on Better Services and Management of Employment for Rural-Urban Migrant Workers, 
issued by the State Council, January 5, 2003. 
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Table 2 – Distribution of sampled households for urban surveys (1995 and 2002) 
 
1995 2002 Province 
Number of cities Number of 
sampled 
households 
Number of cities Number of 
sampled 
households 
Beijing 1 500 1 500 
Shanxi 7 650 7 650 
Liaoning 5 700 5 700 
Jiangsu 9 800 9 750 
Anhui 6 500 6 500 
Henan 8 600 8 700 
Hubei 7 742 7 700 
Guangdong 8 546 8 550 
Chongqing - - 2 300 
Sichuan 7 848 6 600 
Yunnan 9 648 8 650 
Gansu 3 400 3 400 
     
Total  69 6,934 69 7,000 
 
Source: 1995 and 2002 CHIP survey data. 
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Table 3 – Correlation between the three segments 
 
3.1. Ownership / Sector 
 
1995 
 Sector  
Ownership Competitive Oligopolistic 
Public 
service Government Total 
SOEs 88.45 4.49 4.93 2.14 100 
 69.85 38.04 16.62 9.19 52.26 
UCEs 91.51 6.05 2.44 0 100 
 21.11 14.99 2.41 0 15.26 
PIEs 84.15 12.57 3.28 0 100 
 2.07 3.31 0.34 0 1.62 
FIEs 94.7 4.55 0.76 0 100 
 1.68 0.86 0.06 0 1.17 
GAIs 11.82 8.88 42.06 37.24 100 
 5.3 42.8 80.57 90.81 29.68 
Total 66.17 6.16 15.49 12.17 100 
 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
2002 
 Sector  
Ownership Competitive Oligopolistic 
Public 
service Government Total 
SOEs 82.41 10.2 5.68 1.71 100 
 49.39 58.01 9.2 3.75 34.28 
UCEs 90 4.51 5.49 0 100 
 10.92 5.19 1.8 0 6.94 
PIEs 91.03 4.78 4.19 0 100 
 33.1 16.48 4.12 0 20.79 
FIEs 84.49 7.49 8.02 0 100 
 3.76 3.16 0.96 0 2.54 
GAIs 4.57 2.92 50.12 42.4 100 
 2.83 17.16 83.92 96.25 35.44 
Total 57.2 6.03 21.16 15.61 100 
 100 100 100 100 100 
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3.2. Ownership / Region 
 
1995 
   Region    
Ownership Coast Center West Municipality Northeast Total 
SOEs 17.07 35.68 27.21 7.8 12.24 100 
 46.68 55.15 53.39 58.31 60.41 53.8 
UCEs 28.83 31.91 24.05 3.47 11.73 100 
 20.89 13.07 12.5 6.88 15.34 14.26 
PIEs 50 22.62 19.05 3.57 4.76 100 
 1.99 0.51 0.55 0.39 0.34 0.78 
FIEs 55.07 10.87 13.77 12.32 7.97 100 
 3.61 0.4 0.65 2.21 0.94 1.29 
GAIs 17.67 35.97 30.22 7.76 8.38 100 
 26.83 30.86 32.91 32.21 22.96 29.87 
Total 19.67 34.81 27.42 7.19 10.9 100 
 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
2002 
   Region    
Ownership Coast Center West Municipality Northeast Total 
SOEs 17.32 36.61 25.22 8.93 11.93 100 
 33.49 39 34.76 40.95 40.48 37.12 
UCEs 25.96 26.55 24.48 4.57 18.44 100 
 10.09 5.69 6.79 4.22 12.59 7.47 
PIEs 23.83 30.96 26.94 5.38 12.9 100 
 24.14 17.29 19.47 12.93 22.96 19.46 
FIEs 30.33 22.27 12.32 25.59 9.48 100 
 3.67 1.49 1.06 7.35 2.01 2.32 
GAIs 16.34 37.85 30.35 8.32 7.14 100 
 28.61 36.54 37.91 34.56 21.95 33.63 
Total 19.2 34.84 26.92 8.09 10.93 100 
 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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3.3. Sector / Region 
 
1995 
   Region    
Sector Coast Center West Municipality Northeast Total 
Competitive 20.81 35.47 27.01 5.74 10.98 100 
 69.52 65.08 65.45 59.13 72.89 66.46 
Oligop. 25.1 33.47 23.85 7.67 9.9 100 
 7.89 5.78 5.44 7.44 6.19 6.26 
Public serv. 17.65 36.09 28.84 8.79 8.62 100 
 13.55 15.22 16.07 20.84 13.16 15.28 
Government 14.97 42.01 29.8 6.76 6.47 100 
 9.04 13.92 13.04 12.58 7.76 12.01 
Total 19.89 36.23 27.42 6.45 10.01 100 
 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
2002 
   Region    
Sector Coast Center West Municipality Northeast Total 
Competitive 21.54 34.92 27.6 5.94 10 100 
 65.34 54.41 56.75 46.91 62.63 57.34 
Oligop. 15.96 46.12 19.07 8.2 10.64 100 
 5.03 7.47 4.07 6.73 6.93 5.96 
Public serv. 15.79 40.88 27.23 8.49 7.61 100 
 17.54 23.33 20.51 24.55 17.46 21 
Government 14.55 34.65 33.14 10.09 7.57 100 
 12.09 14.79 18.66 21.82 12.99 15.7 
Total 18.9 36.8 27.88 7.26 9.15 100 
 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the 1995 and 2002 CHIP survey data. 
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Table 4:  Descriptive statistics on individual characteristics by ownership 
 
1995 All SOEs UCEs PIEs FIEs GAIs 
# obs. 10,730 5,775 1,534 84 138 3,199 
% 100 53.82 14.30 0.78 1.29 29.81 
       
Male (%) 53.34 55.83 40.81 52.38 54.35 54.83 
Age 38.39 38.42 38.02 32.07 30.96 39.00 
Years of education 10.79 10.47 9.25 9.29 11.07 12.15 
Communist (%) 25.12 21.51 11.54 4.76 10.14 39.32 
Coast (%) 26.91 24.92 32.40 53.57 67.39 25.41 
Long term tenure (%) 96.32 98.32 92.12 7.50 59.26 98.57 
              
2002 All SOEs UCEs PIEs FIEs GAIs 
# obs. 9,081 3,371 678 1,767 211 3,054 
% 100 37.12 7.47 19.46 2.32 33.63 
       
Male (%) 56.69 60.99 43.51 55.80 59.24 55.21 
Age 40.41 41.17 41.36 38.58 35.15 40.78 
Years of education 11.52 11.18 10.06 10.48 12.30 12.75 
Communist (%) 29.88 28.36 19.32 14.20 14.22 44.04 
Coast (%) 27.30 26.25 30.53 29.20 55.92 24.66 
Long term tenure (%) 77.11 88.42 72.57 38.17 56.40 89.64 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the 1995 and 2002 CHIP survey data. 
Notes:  
1. The sample includes individuals aged 16 to 60, who declared working at least a part of the year and 
earning (positive) wages. Owners of private or individual enterprises are not considered. 
2. Education and Experience are the number of years of education and work experience declared by the 
respondent. 
3. “Coast” dummy includes Beijing, Guangdong, and Jiangsu. 
4. Long-term tenure includes both permanent workers and long-term contract workers, as opposed to 
temporary or short-term contract workers. 
5. Ownership categories are: state-owned enterprises (SOEs), urban collective enterprises (UCEs), 
private or individual enterprises, (PIEs), foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs), and government agencies 
or institutions (GAIs). 
6. Tables for different dimensions (ownership, sector and regions) may show slightly different average 
total values and due to attrition on categorical variables.  
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Table 5:  Descriptive statistics on individual characteristics by sectors 
 
1995 All Competitive Oligopolistic Public services Government 
# obs 9,665 6,343 607 1,466 1,249 
% 100 65.63 6.28 15.17 12.92 
      
Male (%) 52.42 52.40 48.60 46.04 61.81 
Age 38.33 38.00 36.08 40.21 38.89 
Years of education 10.78 10.16 10.68 12.32 12.18 
Communist (%) 24.80 18.97 22.73 28.17 51.48 
SOE (%) 81.95 75.07 81.38 97.41 98.96 
Coast (%) 26.93 27.29 33.77 26.74 22.02 
Long term tenure (%) 96.24 95.60 92.32 98.89 98.30 
2002 All Competitive Oligopolistic Public services Government 
# obs 8,195 4,752 706 1,560 1,177 
% 100 57.99 8.62 19.04 14.36 
      
Male (%) 54.31 52.61 58.50 50.32 63.98 
Age 40.44 40.37 39.19 40.65 41.20 
Years of education 11.57 10.69 11.87 13.07 12.96 
Communist (%) 30.24 21.74 29.04 34.17 60.07 
SOE (%) 74.92 61.99 86.54 93.27 95.84 
Coast (%) 27.41 28.83 28.33 24.55 24.89 
Long term tenure (%) 74.44 64.80 81.59 89.87 88.73 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the 1995 and 2002 CHIP survey data. 
Notes:  
1. See Table 4. 
2. See text for a full definition of sectors. 
3. The lower number of observation is due to the omission of unclear sectors. See text for 
details. 
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Table 6:  Descriptive statistics on individual characteristics by regions 
 
1995 All Coast Center West Municipality Northeast 
# obs 10,898 2,170 3,778 2,991 779 1,180 
% 100 19.91 34.67 27.45 7.15 10.83 
       
Male (%) 53.18 53.13 53.81 51.92 54.30 53.73 
Age 38.37 38.45 37.52 38.71 40.24 38.87 
Years of education 10.78 10.48 10.76 10.71 11.86 10.87 
Communist (%) 25.00 23.64 24.80 26.38 31.19 20.51 
SOE (%) 82.35 71.57 85.07 84.75 89.73 82.46 
Long term tenure (%) 96.14 92.86 97.21 96.72 95.45 97.69 
           
2002 All Coast Center West Municipality Northeast 
# obs 9,537 1,812 3,300 2,576 799 1,050 
% 100 19.00 34.60 27.01 8.38 11.01 
       
Male (%) 56.09 54.86 57.06 55.16 54.07 58.95 
Age 40.38 40.57 39.58 40.54 42.46 40.58 
Years of education 11.50 11.33 11.61 11.26 12.26 11.44 
Communist (%) 29.62 28.81 30.18 30.55 29.29 27.24 
SOE (%) 75.23 70.09 79.33 77.76 77.60 63.24 
Long term tenure (%) 74.87 69.87 80.92 76.99 68.46 64.29 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the 1995 and 2002 CHIP survey data. 
Notes:  
4. See Table 4. 
5. See text for a full definition of regions. 
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Table 7:  Descriptive statistics on individual characteristics by ownership 
 
1995 All SOEs UCEs PIEs FIEs GAIs 
       
Total annual earnings 6,155 6,178 4,878 5,199 8,148 6,667 
c.v. 0.51 0.51 0.57 0.81 0.74 0.45 
Gap to average earnings  1.00 0.79 0.84 1.32 1.08 
Basic wage 3,821 3,833 3,240 4,614 6,531 3,942 
c.v. 0.56 0.53 0.59 0.89 0.92 0.49 
Bonus 983 1,067 703 257 847 991 
c.v. 1.64 1.58 2.14 5.19 1.86 1.55 
Subsidies 1,115 1,032 627 76 460 1,556 
c.v. 1.07 0.98 1.16 3.50 1.91 0.97 
Income in kind 99 99 69 105 86 113 
c.v. 2.72 2.62 3.76 4.56 2.53 2.49 
Hourly wage 2.89 2.88 2.36 1.96 3.45 3.15 
c.v. 0.65 0.66 0.82 0.86 0.73 0.54 
Hours worked per week 43.7 44.0 43.5 56.6 47.2 42.8 
c.v. 0.17 0.16 0.23 0.27 0.19 0.15 
        
2002 All SOEs UCEs PIEs FIEs GAIs 
       
Total annual earnings 11,071 10,840 7,630 8,286 13,305 13,547 
c.v. 0.66 0.62 0.61 0.92 0.66 0.53 
Gap to average earnings  0.98 0.69 0.75 1.20 1.22 
Basic wage 9,128 8,985 6,709 7,141 11,081 10,838 
c.v. 0.63 0.58 0.59 0.89 0.61 0.53 
Bonus 1,049 1,149 549 595 1,372 1,290 
c.v. 2.41 2.23 3.75 3.40 2.12 2.15 
Subsidies 673 526 255 166 524 1,231 
c.v. 2.94 2.93 3.40 4.36 4.01 2.26 
Income in kind 130 119 94 139 333 131 
c.v. 7.68 6.81 3.11 11.19 9.02 3.43 
Hourly wage 5.38 5.31 3.64 3.66 6.16 6.79 
c.v. 0.88 0.84 0.66 1.08 0.71 0.79 
Hours worked per week 43.7 42.3 43.5 50.1 44.6 41.4 
c.v. 0.23 0.19 0.23 0.29 0.22 0.19 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the 1995 and 2002 CHIP survey data. 
Notes:  
1. The sample includes individuals aged 16 to 60, who declared working at least a part of the year and 
earning (positive) wages. Owners of private or individual enterprises are not considered. 
2. The earnings variable is defined as the sum of the basic wage, bonuses, allowances and subsidies, 
other wages, and income in kind. 
3. Earnings are deflated using the urban provincial-level spatial price deflators calculated by Brandt 
and Holz (2006). Base = nationwide prices in 2002. 
4. The gap to average earnings is calculated as average total earnings for enterprise category i divided 
by average total earnings for all categories of enterprises (reported in column 1). 
5. Ownership categories are: state-owned enterprises (SOEs), urban collective enterprises (UCEs), 
private or individual enterprises, (PIEs), foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs), and government agencies 
or institutions (GAIs). 
6.  C.V. = coefficient of variation 
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Table 8:  Descriptive statistics on individual characteristics by economic sectors 
 
 
1995 All Competitive Oligopolistic Public services Government 
      
Total annual earnings 6,089 5,824 6,428 6,815 6,419 
c.v. 0.51 0.52 0.59 0.41 0.47 
Gap to average earnings  0.96 1.06 1.12 1.05 
Basic wage 3,792 3,740 3,624 4,038 3,848 
c.v. 0.55 0.57 0.58 0.48 0.49 
Bonus 961 929 1,354 1,005 886 
c.v. 1.66 1.68 1.81 1.33 1.69 
Subsidies 1,098 889 1,243 1,597 1,503 
c.v. 1.07 1.03 1.20 0.88 1.02 
Income in kind 99 91 113 105 123 
c.v. 2.76 2.93 2.37 2.81 2.23 
Hourly wage 2.85 2.73 2.97 3.23 3.00 
c.v. 0.63 0.67 0.69 0.52 0.52 
Hours worked per week 43.7 43.9 44.3 42.9 43.1 
c.v. 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.15 
       
2002 All Competitive Oligopolistic Public services Government 
      
Total annual earnings 10,910 8,860 13,086 14,410 13,245 
c.v. 0.67 0.71 0.66 0.56 0.49 
Gap to average earnings  0.81 1.20 1.32 1.21 
Basic wage 8,959 7,544 10,534 11,069 10,930 
c.v. 0.64 0.69 0.61 0.53 0.52 
Bonus 1,036 777 1,514 1,601 1,042 
c.v. 2.46 2.84 2.20 1.98 2.08 
Subsidies 672 327 730 1,207 1,320 
c.v. 2.96 3.65 2.94 2.18 2.21 
Income in kind 132 101 309 120 165 
c.v. 7.90 7.22 9.12 3.74 3.54 
Hourly wage 5.30 4.13 6.41 7.33 6.64 
c.v. 0.87 0.81 0.69 0.93 0.63 
Hours worked per week 43.8 45.5 41.6 41.7 41.1 
c.v. 0.24 0.26 0.18 0.20 0.18 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the 1995 and 2002 CHIP survey data. 
Notes:  
1. See table 7. 
2. See text for definitions of economic sectors. 
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Table 9:  Descriptive statistics on individual characteristics by regions 
 
1995 All Coast Center West Municipality Northeast 
       
Total annual earnings 6,151 7,558 5,409 5,851 7,495 5,812 
c.v. 0.51 0.55 0.47 0.44 0.48 0.49 
Gap to average earnings  1.23 0.88 0.95 1.22 0.94 
Basic wage 3,824 4,072 3,656 3,693 4,366 3,874 
c.v. 0.56 0.63 0.50 0.51 0.70 0.52 
Bonus 981 1,831 645 773 1,558 639 
c.v. 1.64 1.53 1.27 1.31 1.02 1.59 
Subsidies 1,111 1,357 845 1,217 1,365 1,070 
c.v. 1.07 1.26 1.04 0.88 0.87 0.93 
Income in kind 99 108 115 78 106 78 
c.v. 2.72 2.85 2.32 2.76 2.75 3.84 
Hourly wage 2.89 3.54 2.56 2.74 3.43 2.71 
c.v. 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.62 0.52 0.54 
Hours worked per week 43.7 44.0 43.5 43.8 43.7 43.4 
c.v. 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.16 
        
2002 All Coast Center West Municipality Northeast 
       
Total annual earnings 10,919 13,376 9,782 10,435 12,691 10,090 
c.v. 0.66 0.75 0.61 0.57 0.62 0.62 
Gap to average earnings  1.23 0.90 0.96 1.16 0.92 
Basic wage 9,022 10,251 8,423 8,664 10,233 8,736 
c.v. 0.64 0.72 0.58 0.59 0.71 0.58 
Bonus 1,011 1,780 677 878 1,396 769 
c.v. 2.45 2.14 2.33 2.28 2.24 2.64 
Subsidies 656 1,071 361 748 902 454 
c.v. 2.98 2.77 3.10 2.32 3.02 3.01 
Income in kind 129 222 129 71 150 97 
c.v. 7.66 9.40 3.32 3.60 5.23 3.87 
Hourly wage 5.30 6.54 4.71 5.11 6.29 4.76 
c.v. 0.89 0.98 0.83 0.86 0.79 0.65 
Hours worked per week 43.8 43.7 44.3 44.1 41.3 43.8 
c.v. 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.20 0.22 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the 1995 and 2002 CHIP survey data. 
Notes:  
1. See table 7. 
2. See text for definitions of regional variables. 
 
 
 
Table 10 – Decomposition of observed earnings gaps by ownership 
 
 
1995     Observed differences Endowment effect Segmentation effect Hours worked effect 
 (A)  (B)   (B)-(A)   5% 95%     5% 95%     5% 95%     5% 95% 
SOE              UCE (yuan) -1,299 *** -1,454 -1,147 -352 *** -498 -215 -811 *** -968 -641 -136 *** -241 -56
        (%) -27 *** - - -7 *** -10 -4 -17 *** -20 -13 -3 *** -5 -1
SOE                PIE (yuan) -979 *** -1,623 -189 -578 ns -3,950 1,391 -1,228 ns -3,692 3,587 827 * -502 1,968
        (%) -19 *** - - -11 ns -79 28 -24 ns -74 69 16 * -10 39
SOE               FIE (yuan) 1,970 *** 1,250 2,797 303 ns -500 1,500 1,394 *** 251 2,496 273 * -184 606
        (%) 32 *** - - 5 ns -8 24 23 *** 4 41 4 * -3 10
SOE              GAI (yuan) 490 *** 388 593 133 *** 41 220 532 *** 379 656 -175 *** -234 -120
          (%) 8 *** - - 2 *** 1 4 9 *** 6 11 -3 *** -4 -2
UCE                 PIE (yuan) 321 ns -309 1,005 -485 ns -5,256 1,492 -279 ns -2,713 4,440 1,084 *** 146 1,952
       (%) 7 ns - - -10 ns -108 31 -6 ns -57 95 22 *** 3 41
UCE             FIE (yuan) 3,270 *** 2,572 4,070 823 *** 236 1,828 1,958 *** 1,016 2,969 490 *** 112 845
        (%) 67 *** - - 17 *** 5 38 40 *** 21 61 10 *** 2 18
UCE              GAI (yuan) 1,789 *** 1,648 1,909 445 *** 202 676 1,336 *** 1,069 1,595 9 ns -117 179
        (%) 37 *** - - 9 *** 4 14 27 *** 22 33 0 ns -2 4
PIE                 FIE (yuan) 2,949 *** 2,020 3,933 1,712 ns -2,301 5,953 1,833 ns -4,521 5,771 -596 * -2,390 1,224
       (%) 57 *** - - 33 ns -40 123 35 ns -89 118 -12 * -47 23
PIE                 GAI (yuan) 1,468 *** 678 2,139 -640 * -2,887 3,420 3,028 ** -1,649 5,447 -919 * -2,475 634
        (%) 28 *** - - -12 * -56 68 58 ** -40 109 -18 * -47 12
FIE               GAI (yuan) -1,481 *** -2,325 -749 -155 ns -1,365 1,120 -943 *** -2,377 -5 -383 ns -904 394
        (%) -22 *** - - -2 ns -21 17 -14 *** -36 0 -6 ns -14 6
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2002     Observed differences Endowment effect Segmentation effect Hours worked effect 
 (A)  (B)   (B)-(A)   5% 95%     5% 95%     5% 95%     5% 95% 
SOE               UCE (yuan) -3,210 *** -3,521 -2,788 -913 *** -1,240 -598 -2,552 *** -2,957 -2,119 256 *** 93 451
      (%) -42 *** - - -12 *** -16 -8 -33 *** -40 -27 3 *** 1 6
SOE                PIE (yuan) -2,554 *** -2,932 -2,243 128 ns -980 1,416 -4,163 *** -5,861 -2,678 1,481 *** 921 2,318
      (%) -31 *** - - 2 ns -12 17 -50 *** -72 -32 18 *** 11 28
SOE               FIE (yuan) 2,465 *** 1,589 3,512 165 ns -802 1,222 1,746 *** 610 2,770 554 *** 97 938
        (%) 23 *** - - 2 ns -7 11 16 *** 6 25 5 *** 1 9
SOE              GAI (yuan) 2,707 *** 2,450 2,998 411 *** 113 727 2,476 *** 2,131 2,853 -180 *** -364 -43
        (%) 25 *** - - 4 *** 1 7 23 *** 19 26 -2 *** -3 0
UCE              PIE (yuan) 656 *** 279 1,019 1,182 *** 544 1,849 -1,552 *** -2,563 -619 1,026 *** 758 1,394
        (%) 9 *** - - 16 *** 7 24 -20 *** -33 -8 13 *** 10 18
UCE               FIE (yuan) 5,675 *** 4,843 6,953 1,526 *** 272 3,110 3,857 *** 2,346 5,460 292 * -242 948
        (%) 74 *** - - 20 *** 4 41 51 *** 31 74 4 * -3 12
UCE              GAI (yuan) 5,917 *** 5,567 6,256 1,398 *** 638 2,140 4,952 *** 4,256 5,821 -433 *** -826 -141
        (%) 78 *** - - 18 *** 8 28 65 *** 55 77 -6 *** -11 -2
PIE               FIE (yuan) 5,019 *** 4,111 6,100 515 ns -1,574 2,342 5,403 *** 3,974 6,728 -899 *** -1,811 -338
       (%) 61 *** - - 6 ns -19 28 65 *** 47 81 -11 *** -22 -4
PIE                GAI (yuan) 5,261 *** 4,925 5,683 543 ns -1,396 2,083 6,434 *** 5,452 7,490 -1,716 *** -3,068 -915
       (%) 64 *** - - 7 ns -17 26 78 *** 65 90 -21 *** -37 -11
FIE                GAI (yuan) 242 ns -957 1,092 248 ns -1,047 1,439 712 ns -631 2,189 -717 *** -1,321 -146
       (%) 2 ns - - 2 ns -8 11 5 ns -5 17 -5 *** -10 -1
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the 1995 and 2002 CHIP survey data. 
Notes: 1. Percentages are calculated as a percentage of the lowest wage.  
2. Decompositions based on regressions results presented in Appendices A and B.  
3. Confidence intervals and significance test are derived from a 300 replications bootstrap procedure: * indicates that the estimated effect is statistically significant at 
20 percent, ** at 10 percent and *** at 5 percent. 
4. Ownership categories are: state-owned enterprises (SOEs), urban collective enterprises (UCEs), private or individual enterprises, (PIEs), foreign-invested 
enterprises (FIEs), and government agencies or institutions (GAIs). 
5. Earnings are deflated using the urban provincial-level spatial price deflators calculated by Brandt and Holz (2006). Base = nationwide prices in 2002. 
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Table 11 – Decomposition of observed earnings gaps by sectors 
 
1995     Observed differences Endowment effect Segmentation effect Hours worked effect 
 (A)  (B)   
(B)-
(A)                5% 95% 5% 95% 5% 95% 5% 95%
Comp                  Olig (yuan) 604 *** 373 880 71 ns -137 288 503 *** 195 771 30 ns -83 147
          (%) 10 *** - - 1 ns -2 5 9 *** 3 13 1 ns -1 3
Comp                 Publ. Serv. (yuan) 992 *** 859 1,107 358 *** 152 605 722 *** 443 935 -88 *** -170 -6
         (%) 17 *** - - 6 *** 3 10 12 *** 8 16 -2 *** -3 0
Comp                  Govt (yuan) 595 *** 459 695 281 *** 61 432 438 *** 268 681 -124 *** -198 -58
          (%) 10 *** - - 5 *** 1 7 8 *** 5 12 -2 *** -3 -1
Olig                 Publ. Serv. (yuan) 387 *** 103 662 545 *** 217 1,005 -8 ns -519 399 -150 ** -285 5
          (%) 6 *** - - 9 *** 3 16 0 ns -8 6 -2 ** -4 0
Olig                  Govt (yuan) -9 ns -287 258 470 ** -53 1,041 -348 ns -1,080 243 -131 ** -276 31
        (%) 0 ns - - 7 ** -1 16 -5 ns -17 4 -2 ** -4 1
Publ. Serv. Govt (yuan) -396                *** -556 -247 -40 ns -189 120 -361 *** -546 -191 4 ns -89 101
        (%) -6 *** - - -1 ns -3 2 -6 *** -9 -3 0 ns -1 2
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2002      Observed differences Endowment effect Segmentation effect Hours worked effect 
 (A)  (B)   (B)-(A)   5% 95%     5% 95%     5% 95%     5% 95% 
Comp                Olig (yuan) 4,227 *** 3,796 4,771 -125 ns -916 444 5,241 *** 4,699 5,829 -890 *** -1,408 -506
       (%) 48 *** - - -1 ns -10 5 59 *** 53 66 -10 *** -16 -6
Comp              Publ. Serv. (yuan) 5,550 *** 5,138 5,868 615 *** 195 1,058 5,628 *** 5,343 5,829 -693 *** -1,111 -371
       (%) 63 *** - - 7 *** 2 12 64 *** 60 66 -8 *** -13 -4
Comp               Govt (yuan) 4,385 *** 4,017 4,735 884 *** 120 1,467 4,411 *** 3,883 5,002 -910 *** -1,436 -509
       (%) 50 *** - - 10 *** 1 17 50 *** 44 57 -10 *** -16 -6
Olig              Publ. Serv. (yuan) 1,323 *** 725 1,839 592 ** -70 1,166 645 ** -70 1,389 86 ns -178 351
        (%) 10 *** - - 5 ** -1 9 5 ** -1 11 1 ns -1 3
Olig                 Govt (yuan) 159 ns -313 668 1,155 *** 456 1,926 -891 *** -1,775 -19 -105 ns -347 155
        (%) 1 ns - - 9 *** 3 15 -7 *** -14 0 -1 ns -3 1
Publ. Serv. Govt (yuan) -1,165              *** -1,608 -750 766 *** 139 1,428 -1,684 *** -2,108 -1,172 -246 *** -483 -7
      (%) -9 *** - - 6 *** 1 11 -13 *** -16 -9 -2 *** -4 0
Source: Authors’ calculations using the 1995 and 2002 CHIP survey data. 
Notes: See Table 10 and text for a full definition of sectors. 
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Table 12 – Decomposition of observed earnings gaps by regions 
 
1995     Observed differences Endowment effect Segmentation effect Hours worked effect 
 (A)  (B)   (B)-(A)   5% 95%     5% 95%     5% 95%     5% 95% 
Coast                 Centre (yuan) -2,149 *** -2,293 -1,984 -215 *** -312 -117 -1,908 *** -2,047 -1,764 -27 ns -81 27
  (%) -40 *** - - -4 *** -6    -2 -35 *** -38 -32 -1 ns -2 1
Coast                West (yuan) -1,707 *** -1,861 -1,547 -104 ** -239 21 -1,664 *** -1,853 -1,472 61 ** -6 122
  (%) -29 *** - - -2 ** -4    0 -28 *** -32 -25 1 ** 0 2
Coast              Municip (yuan) -63 ns -287 176 640 *** 71 1,290 -844 *** -1,492 -175 141 ns -95 379
  (%) -1 ns -       - 9 *** 1 17 -11 *** -20 -2 2 ns -1 5
Coast                 N-E. (yuan) -1,746 *** -1,975 -1,545 519 *** 134 870 -2,337 *** -2,838 -1,936 72 * -19 195
      (%) -30 *** - - 9 *** 2 15 -40 *** -50 -33 1 * 0 3
Centre                West (yuan) 442 *** 355 529 131 *** 52 225 251 *** 156 347 60 *** 13 104
  (%) 8 *** -        - 2 *** 1 4 5 *** 3 6 1 *** 0 2
Centre               Municip (yuan) 2,086 *** 1,857 2,263 790 *** 383 1,182 1,199 *** 756 1,668 97 * -29 233
  (%) 39 *** - - 15 *** 7      22 22 *** 14 31 2 * -1 4
Centre                N-E. (yuan) 403 *** 238 563 723 *** 317 1,121 -382 * -832 93 62 * -36 174
          (%) 7 *** - - 13 *** 6 21 -7 * -15 2 1 * -1 3
West               Municip (yuan) 1,644 *** 1,429 1,840 791 *** 373 1,204 814 *** 347 1,316 39 ns -63 158
  (%) 28 *** - - 14 *** 6      21 14 *** 6 22 1 ns -1 3
West                N-E. (yuan) -39 ns -185 124 633 *** 360 923 -663 *** -986 -343 -9 ns -105 95
          (%) -1 ns - - 11 *** 6 16 -11 *** -17 -6 0 ns -2 2
Municip                N-E. (yuan) -1,683 *** -1,914 -1,419 -585 *** -1,018 -156 -994 *** -1,495 -509 -105 * -262 36
       (%) -29 *** - - -10 *** -17 -3 -17 *** -26 -9 -2 * -4 1
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2002     Observed differences Endowment effect Segmentation effect Hours worked effect 
 (A)  (B)   (B)-(A)   5% 95%     5% 95%     5% 95%     5% 95% 
Coast                 Centre (yuan) -3,594 *** -3,903 -3,153 142 ns -255 509 -3,967 *** -4,156 -3,654 231 *** 85 424
  (%) -37 *** - - 2 ns -3    5 -41 *** -43 -38 2 *** 1 4
Coast                 West (yuan) -2,941 *** -3,453 -2,554 -202 ns -591 231 -2,879 *** -3,413 -2,337 141 ** -2 288
  (%) -28 *** - - -2 ns -6    2 -28 *** -33 -22 1 ** 0 3
Coast               Municip (yuan) -685 *** -1,248 -177 1,808 ** -61 4,305 -2,312 *** -4,987 -799 -181 ns -631 193
  (%) -5 *** - -      14 ** -1 34 -18 *** -39 -6 -1 ns -5 2
Coast                 N-E. (yuan) -3,285 *** -3,720 -2,879 731 ** -144 1,681 -4,178 *** -4,559 -3,722 162 * -124 433
      (%) -33 *** - - 7 ** -1 17 -41 *** -46 -37 2 * -1 4
Centre               West (yuan) 653 *** 361 1,006 -313 *** -517 -91 1,050 *** 659 1,475 -84 * -199 36
  (%) 7 *** -       - -3 *** -5 -1 11 *** 7 15 -1 * -2 0
Centre               Municip (yuan) 2,909 *** 2,341 3,418 723 ns -791 2,178 2,670 *** 1,341 4,077 -484 *** -832 -87
  (%) 30 *** - - 7 ns -8      22 27 *** 14 41 -5 *** -9 -1
Centre                 N-E. (yuan) 309 ** -46 670 173 ns -243 634 222 ns -354 832 -86 ns -287 98
          (%) 3 ** - - 2 ns -3 7 2 ns -4 9 -1 ns -3 1
West                Municip (yuan) 2,256 *** 1,760 2,735 1,362 * -247 2,894 1,191 * -528 2,958 -298 *** -600 -23
  (%) 22 *** - - 13 * -2      28 11 * -5 28 -3 *** -6 0
West              N-E. (yuan) -344 *** -822 0 597 *** 211 1,028 -995 *** -1,584 -371 54 ns -183 261
         (%) -3 *** - - 6 *** 2 10 -10 *** -16 -4 1 ns -2 3
Municip                N-E. (yuan) -2,600 *** -3,227 -2,060 -997 *** -1,782 -180 -2,056 *** -3,100 -1,134 452 *** 184 721
      (%) -26 *** - - -10 *** -18 -2 -20 *** -31 -11 5 *** 2 7
Source: Authors’ calculations using the 1995 and 2002 CHIP survey data. 
Notes: See Table 10 and text for a full definition of regions. 
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Appendix A1 - Hourly wage functions by ownership, Year: 1995 
  SOEs UCEs PIEs FIEs GAIs 
            
           
Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men
Education 0.015          
          
          
          
          
          
         
          
          
          
          
          
         
          
          
          
-1.67          
      
          
          
          
          
0.025 0.002 0.018 -0.245 -0.069 0.052 0.074 0.021 0.013
 3.11 5.56 0.17 1.46 -2.02 -0.57 1.2 1.53 3.54 3.2
Work Exp. 0.069 0.045 0.074 0.062 0.178 0.111 0.028 0.026 0.052 0.044
 10.05 11.07 5.78 6.05 2.23 1.49 1.04 1.1 8.11 9.02
(Work Exp.)² -0.00128
 
-0.00065
 
-0.00172
 
-0.00123
 
-0.00491
 
-0.00332
 
0.00001
 
-0.00027
 
-0.00086
 
-0.00061
  -7.06 -6.67 -4.39 -5.01 -1.51 -1.23 0.01 -0.4 -5.46 -6.05
Central Province -0.055 -0.023
 
0.024 -0.025 0.523 -0.173 0.593 0.338 -0.127 -0.066
 -2.17 -1 0.53 -0.41 0.76 -0.31 1.97 1.32 -4.56 -3.21
Coastal Province 0.153 0.216 0.312 0.275 2.351 0.409 0.758 0.527 0.205 0.226
 4.92 8.64 6.41 4.93 4.16 0.77 2.72 2.2 6.07 7.73
Big city 0.130 0.135 0.156 0.116 1.716 0.841 0.364 -0.086 0.010 0.057
 6.08 6.95 4.06 2.34 3.14 3.11 2.27 -0.56 0.37 2.57
Communist 0.147
 
0.076 0.080 0.178 -0.361 0.924 -0.089 -0.061 0.003 -0.014
 5 3.6 1.16 2.42 -0.46 2.73 -0.37 -0.29 0.09 -0.66
Vocational School -0.057 -0.016 -0.128 -0.104 -0.634 -0.340 0.064 -0.139 -0.176 -0.107
 -2.07 -0.59 -2.52 -1.62 -1.01 -0.68 0.29 -0.56 -3.64 -2.75
Change in hukou -0.065 0.043 -0.074 0.013 -1.802 -0.946 0.050 0.089 -0.087 0.032
 1.48 -1.25 0.17 -2.7 -1.6 0.28 0.45 -2.34 1.54
Constant term -0.138 -0.025 -0.139 -0.134 0.137 0.083 -0.756 -0.343 0.168 0.288 
 -1.54 -0.35 -0.92 -0.72 0.09 0.05 -1.62 -0.51 1.65 3.74
 
# obs. 2551 3224 908 626 40 44 63 75 1445 1754
R² 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.53 0.35 0.35 0.21 0.25 0.26
Note: T-statistics in italics. 
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Appendix A2 - Hourly wage functions by ownership, Year: 2002 
  SOEs UCEs PIEs FIEs GAIs 
            
           
Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men
Education 0.041          
         
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
      
          
      
          
          
0.044 0.034
 
0.018 0.117 0.096 0.052 0.103 0.068 0.048
 4.95 7.26 2 0.98 5.06 6.35 2.29 4.24 10.71 9.33
Work Exp. 0.061 0.045 0.040 0.048 0.019 0.048 0.051 0.043 0.050 0.037
 5.82 7.43 2.52 2.91 1.11 3.27 1.76 2.12 6.48 6.65
(Work Exp.)² -0.0013
 
-0.0009
 
-0.0008
 
-0.0009
 
0.0000
 
-0.0006
 
-0.0013
 
-0.0004
 
-0.0009
 
-0.0005
  -4.69 -5.97 -1.98 -2.63 0.08 -1.63 -1.51 -0.87 -4.33 -4.13
Central Province -0.112 -0.014 -0.192 0.061 -0.212 -0.151 0.476 0.263 -0.198 -0.102
 -2.68 -0.46 -2.33 0.68 -2.11 -1.47 2.17 1.79 -5.44 -3.46
Coastal Province 0.105 0.174 0.088 0.191 0.311 0.447 0.558 0.272 0.178 0.167
 2.15 4.93 0.96 1.83 3.27 4.73 2.43 2.08 4.19 4.6
Big city 0.176 0.109 0.132 0.278 0.297 0.374 0.174 0.210 -0.033 0.126
 4.96 4.12 1.98 3.87 3.65 4.65 1.12 1.63 -0.97 4.47
Communist 0.135 0.136 0.253 0.164 0.387 0.279 0.523 -0.138 0.052 0.116
 3.08 4.54 2.73 2.06 3.25 3.16 2.65 -0.71 1.37 4.06
Vocational School 0.094 0.052 0.133 0.135 -0.065 0.162 0.151 -0.135 0.021 0.004
 1.84 1.55 1.22 1.11 -0.55 1.68 0.8 -0.87 0.59 0.14
Change in hukou -0.166 -0.077 -0.096 0.158 -0.190 0.058 0.254 0.039 0.043 0.065
 -2.72 -1.74 -0.91 1.74 -1.35 0.39 0.84 0.24 0.85 2.14
Constant term 0.203 0.394 0.246 0.198 -0.956 -1.071 -0.299 -0.399 0.247 0.539 
 1.69 3.99 1.14 0.73 -3.31
 
-5.02
 
-0.77
 
-1.16
 
2.24 5.55
 
# obs. 1315 2056 383 295 781 986 86 125 1368 1686
R² 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.23 0.19 0.18
Note: T-statistics in italics. 
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Appendix A3 - Hourly wage functions by economic sector, Year: 1995 
  Competitive Oligopolistic Public Services Government 
      
         
Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men
Education 0.017        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
      
      
      
        
      29 24 
0.023 0.043 0.056 0.026 0.021 0.019 0.011
 3.62 5.12 2.22 3.35 4.04 3.1 1.65 2.07
Work Exp. 0.058 0.045 0.064 0.059 0.052 0.059 0.044 0.032
 9.33 11.3 4.03 5.01 6.74 6.06 3.51 4.41
(Work Exp.)² -0.0011
 
-0.0007
 
-0.0013
 
-0.0010
 
-0.0008
 
-0.0009
 
-0.0006
 
-0.0004
  -6.2 -7.22 -2.65 -3.46 -4.51 -3.86 -2.09 -2.68
Central Province -0.035 -0.046 -0.080 -0.058 -0.104 -0.002 -0.102 -0.081
 -1.39 -2.01 -0.76 -0.77 -3.03 -0.07 -1.99 -2.81
Coastal Province 0.211 0.208 0.322 0.239 0.190 0.231 0.262 0.242
 7.45 8.46 2.82 2.62 4.8 5.77 3.83 5.25
Big city 0.159 0.159 0.136 -0.064 0.049 0.079 -0.099 0.078
 7.9 8.19 1.63 -0.8 1.62 2.41 -1.81 2.29
Communist 0.145 0.091 0.188 0.031 -0.002 0.003 0.073 0.023
 4.89 4.19 1.79 0.4 -0.06 0.08 1.41 0.72
Vocational School -0.065 -0.055 -0.260 -0.088 -0.120 -0.195 -0.222 -0.025
 -2.45 -2.03 -2.15 -0.84 -2.03 -2.88 -2.25 -0.51
Change in hukou -0.065 0.034 -0.204 0.030 -0.006 0.057 -0.228 -0.029
 -1.64 1.17 -1.48 0.31 -0.13 1.54 -3.69 -1.01
Constant term -0.115
 
-0.002 -0.281 -0.292
 
0.052 0.014 0.215 0.402 
 -1.4 -0.03
 
-0.99
 
-1.2 0.47 0.11 1.06 3.69
 
# obs. 3019 3324 312 295 791 675 477
0.
772
0.R² 0.18 0.19 0.28 0.25 0.28 0.33
Note: T-statistics in italics. 
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Appendix A4 - Hourly wage functions by economic sector, Year: 2002 
  Competitive Oligopolistic Public Services Government 
  Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men 
         
Education 0.071 0.071 0.043 0.036 0.068 0.058 0.054 0.031 
 7.42 9.82 2.12 2.56 7.32 6.63 3.81 3.94 
Work Exp. 0.056 0.049 0.098 0.042 0.046 0.042 0.065 0.036 
 6.66 6.81 4.93 3.1 4.34 4.48 4.82 3.69 
(Work Exp.)² -0.0011 -0.0008 -0.0020 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0014 -0.0005 
 -4.4 -4.74 -3.74 -1.83 -2.72 -3.07 -3.88 -2.44 
Central Province -0.116 -0.035 -0.296 -0.176 -0.260 -0.154 -0.151 -0.096 
 -2.57 -0.79 -3.25 -2.28 -4.85 -3.3 -1.91 -2.23 
Coastal Province 0.219 0.261 0.050 0.182 0.162 0.083 0.010 0.177 
 4.72 6.03 0.5 2.11 2.68 1.4 0.13 3.31 
Big city 0.173 0.320 0.246 0.009 0.081 0.165 -0.015 0.106 
 4.76 9.32 3.06 0.14 1.7 4.01 -0.24 2.52 
Communist 0.231 0.196 0.130 0.155 0.168 0.142 0.016 0.154 
 5.19 5.96 1.39 2.04 3.2 2.84 0.25 3.25 
Vocational School 0.073 0.042 0.018 0.172 0.030 0.023 0.078 -0.014 
 1.39 0.97 0.17 2.58 0.64 0.53 1.11 -0.37 
Change in hukou -0.083 -0.021 -0.172 -0.022 -0.056 0.081 -0.100 0.065 
 -1.25 -0.33 -1.13 -0.26 -0.77 1.51 -0.9 1.62 
Constant term -0.460 -0.437 0.099 0.674 0.294 0.439 0.377 0.732 
 -3.56 -3.73 0.34 3.09 1.86 2.68 1.65 4.58 
         
# obs. 2252 2500 293 413 775 785 424 753 
R² 0.15 0.15 0.27 0.18 0.21 0.19 0.14 0.17 
Note: T-statistics in italics. 
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Appendix A5 - Hourly wage functions by region, Year: 1995 
  Coast Centre West Municipality North-East 
  Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men 
           
Education 0.022 0.028 0.025 0.027 0.030 0.024 0.020 0.035 0.037 0.025 
 3.31 4.09 3.62 5.2 4.41 4.05 1.16 2.83 3.83 2.51 
Work Exp. 0.061 0.060 0.056 0.049 0.066 0.041 0.047 0.022 0.044 0.036 
 5.66 9.74 9.2 8.91 6.92 6.79 2.58 2.38 4.55 4.04 
(Work Exp.)² -0.00129 -0.00107 -0.00092 -0.00068 -0.00110 -0.00047 -0.00076 -0.00030 -0.00079 -0.00052 
 -3.93 -7.81 -5.54 -5.39 -4.75 -3.64 -1.65 -1.54 -3.01 -2.46 
Big city 0.117 0.106 0.120 0.103 0.147 0.127 0.000 0.000 0.397 0.339 
 2.91 3.02 3.93 3.83 5 5.02 . . 7.52 5.33 
Communist 0.202 0.161 0.102 0.073 0.061 0.007 0.149 0.103 0.074 0.095 
 3.64 4.62 2.77 2.86 1.7 0.29 2.64 2.09 1.43 1.77 
Vocational School -0.157 -0.044 -0.124 -0.062 -0.099 -0.098 0.025 0.004 -0.127 -0.037 
 -3.32 -0.98 -3.19 -1.64 -2.36 -2.41 0.28 0.06 -2.32 -0.58 
Change in hukou -0.119 -0.025 -0.077 0.056 -0.021 0.041 -0.115 -0.005 -0.095 0.098 
 -1.84 -0.61 -1.82 2.02 -0.4 1.19 -1 -0.06 -1.01 1.19 
Constant term 0.232 0.128 -0.164 -0.104 -0.292 0.050 0.163 0.427 -0.378 -0.097 
 2.21 1.18 -1.63 -1.26 -2.4 0.46 0.5 2.51 -2.53 -0.58 
           
# obs. 1017 1153 1745 2033 1438 1553 356 423 546 634 
R² 0.16 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.15 0.10 0.27 0.16 
Note: T-statistics in italics. 
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Appendix A6 - Hourly wage functions by region, Year: 2002 
  Coast Centre West Municipality North-East 
  Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men 
           
Education 0.099 0.074 0.092 0.083 0.078 0.088 0.080 0.075 0.119 0.069 
 8.15 8.86 8.52 10.08 9.04 11.93 4.34 5.28 4.77 5.83 
Work Exp. 0.069 0.051 0.053 0.040 0.051 0.060 0.061 0.050 0.013 0.018 
 5.77 5.12 4.42 4.62 4.96 5.99 3.83 4.28 0.97 1.85 
(Work Exp.)² -0.00136 -0.00089 -0.00078 -0.00051 -0.00069 -0.00085 -0.00167 -0.00087 0.00016 -0.00018 
 -4.15 -3.92 -2.17 -2.5 -2.6 -3.71 -4.14 -3.2 0.46 -0.76 
Big city 0.198 0.327 0.122 0.134 0.111 0.232 0.000 0.000 0.101 0.160 
 3.28 7.16 2.63 3.26 2.51 5.52 . . 1.15 2.05 
Communist 0.322 0.324 0.108 0.209 0.197 0.258 0.207 0.124 0.093 0.189 
 4.61 6.32 2.08 5.25 4.19 6.7 2.37 1.84 1 3.14 
Vocational School 0.109 0.017 0.162 0.070 0.157 0.132 -0.113 -0.104 0.097 0.072 
 1.54 0.29 3.06 1.79 2.89 3.34 -1.23 -1.37 1.16 1.21 
Change in hukou -0.215 0.025 -0.051 0.050 0.098 0.048 0.014 0.117 0.205 0.019 
 -2.81 0.42 -0.67 1.05 1.27 0.76 0.06 1.1 1.68 0.14 
Constant term -0.447 -0.021 -0.655 -0.337 -0.382 -0.631 0.096 0.211 -0.676 0.195 
 -2.49 -0.14 -4.07 -2.3 -2.7 -4.38 0.35 0.97 -1.88 1.1 
           
# obs. 818 994 1417 1883 1155 1421 367 432 431 619 
R² 0.25 0.22 0.15 0.14 0.19 0.23 0.12 0.14 0.23 0.13 
Note: T-statistics in italics. 
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Appendix B1 - Hours worked functions by ownership, Year: 1995 
  SOEs UCEs PIEs FIEs GAIs 
  Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men 
           
Education -0.189 7.237 4.002 -30.707 42.989 -57.875 7.051 -111.28 1.223 6.970 
 -0.05 1.41 0.21 -1.85 0.29 -0.69 0.28 -2.03 0.24 1.26 
Age -12.75 2.60 -16.21 -64.51 -63.88 -369.23 16.64 -3.49 9.42 5.11 
 -1.36 0.34 -0.73 -2.75 -0.43 -2.80 0.26 -0.08 1.06 0.55 
(Age)² 0.151 -0.052 0.243 0.783 0.983 4.531 -0.341 0.215 -0.118 -0.083 
 1.20 -0.58 0.81 2.62 0.47 3.06 -0.42 0.37 -1.02 -0.78 
Communist 3.68 52.24 -38.94 -55.99 369.48 -1011.9 -54.86 249.54 10.27 36.67 
 0.19 3.48 -0.61 -0.89 0.70 -3.41 -0.28 1.28 0.55 2.05 
Married -20.16 65.44 -113.11 103.73 495.47 986.98 -48.33 -164.16 18.27 -22.27 
 -0.62 1.70 -1.52 1.00 1.47 2.17 -0.20 -0.78 0.39 -0.35 
Square root of household size 807.2 -551.2 -1215.6 -13.3 7546.3 11043.6 -716.1 733.2 311.8 -85.2 
 2.60 -1.55 -1.61 -0.02 0.88 3.46 -0.22 0.22 0.81 -0.21 
Dependent elderly in the household 26.23 31.33 8.45 45.34 -115.39 103.58 -82.00 230.73 -29.49 -9.02 
 0.81 1.55 0.17 0.59 -0.24 0.50 -0.69 1.19 -1.06 -0.23 
Household size -184.5 153.6 347.3 66.8 -1728.1 -2544.8 316.8 -228.1 -67.0 23.5 
 -2.27 1.62 1.75 0.30 -0.77 -3.46 0.36 -0.26 -0.65 0.22 
Average education of adult hh members -6.46 -13.80 -18.13 5.13 -27.79 17.09 -42.88 39.56 2.54 2.59 
 -1.37 -2.83 -1.37 0.38 -0.35 0.34 -1.50 1.00 0.47 0.36 
Average age of adult hh members -1.348 -2.475 -3.439 -4.821 -1.084 33.592 8.252 -18.644 0.997 1.757 
 -1.03 -1.59 -0.98 -1.28 -0.05 1.78 0.89 -1.69 0.68 0.78 
Child of hh head -17.95 57.97 -138.23 -85.63 654.07 -262.67 -176.79 357.07 47.94 -2.05 
 -0.43 1.38 -1.64 -0.78 1.42 -0.50 -0.79 1.36 1.05 -0.03 
Vocational school -6.43 23.27 63.22 -99.56 353.90 515.52 280.08 -205.21 41.84 99.81 
 -0.37 1.13 0.99 -1.39 0.62 1.43 1.29 -1.13 1.56 3.33 
Change in hukou 12.79 47.83 41.07 -18.35 -95.82 295.29 -197.25 114.39 -39.35 -10.16 
 0.55 2.14 0.70 -0.29 -0.24 0.74 -1.41 0.83 -1.68 -0.48 
Big city -13.01 -40.41 -79.68 -58.00 -474.62 -607.03 -47.13 -15.81 -22.34 17.43 
 -1.02 -2.96 -2.55 -1.25 -1.38 -2.34 -0.36 -0.15 -1.32 0.90 
Coastal Province -23.659 -0.631 91.032 -9.099 -149.21 259.689 33.716 234.191 -21.663 -58.345 
 -1.33 -0.03 2.00 -0.18 -0.51 0.84 0.24 1.06 -0.93 -2.35 
Central Province -37.467 -31.587 23.360 -25.180 475.089 -70.934 -50.924 -147.87 4.407 -13.147 
 -2.65 -1.99 0.58 -0.45 1.31 -0.18 -0.25 -0.67 0.25 -0.66 
Constant term 1787.6 2814.6 3811.6 3710.3 -4966.1 -3184.6 2564.1 2965.1 1554.0 2043.4 
 5.25 7.79 4.32 4.28 -0.52 -0.75 0.93 0.85 3.85 5.11 
           
# obs. 2551 3224 908 626 40 44 63 75 1445 1754 
R² 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.35 0.66 0.32 0.32 0.01 0.01 
Note: T-statistics in italics. 
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Appendix B2 - Hours worked functions by ownership, Year: 2002 
  SOEs UCEs PIEs FIEs GAIs 
  Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men 
           
Education -2.623 -6.517 7.968 -17.404 -26.030 -34.807 -87.406 -34.854 -6.396 3.376 
 -0.39 -1.03 0.52 -0.84 -1.60 -2.64 -1.94 -1.32 -0.97 0.58 
Age -33.04 14.01 13.23 9.14 -27.65 -25.44 13.24 -41.59 -12.15 0.12 
 -2.18 1.35 0.40 0.27 -0.99 -0.94 0.18 -0.84 -0.94 0.01 
(Age)² 0.417 -0.182 -0.240 -0.301 0.429 0.273 -0.180 0.527 0.109 0.015 
 2.16 -1.52 -0.55 -0.71 1.11 0.84 -0.18 0.90 0.65 0.10 
Communist 43.55 -18.48 -123.21 5.04 -94.20 -188.15 -37.36 -51.00 -5.31 -11.22 
 1.77 -0.92 -1.97 0.06 -1.17 -3.25 -0.28 -0.47 -0.25 -0.54 
Married -41.46 74.44 -121.30 1.98 89.66 11.47 143.08 68.85 28.94 45.58 
 -0.89 1.27 -0.94 0.02 0.77 0.08 0.54 0.41 0.65 1.10 
Square root of household size 830.6 326.9 -11.4 -283.1 -649.2 -2062.2 -3905.6 1659.4 335.0 173.4 
 1.49 0.64 -0.01 -0.20 -0.49 -1.66 -1.30 0.62 0.92 0.41 
Dependent elderly in the household 26.26 -9.56 -137.58 -45.28 30.03 -22.32 -472.73 -178.08 -5.97 -24.96 
 0.64 -0.24 -2.10 -0.45 0.39 -0.31 -1.73 -1.18 -0.17 -0.76 
Household size -195.6 -71.8 2.5 131.1 224.2 595.5 1183.7 -434.7 -92.2 -73.2 
 -1.27 -0.50 0.01 0.36 0.61 1.78 1.40 -0.60 -0.95 -0.66 
Average education of adult hh members -4.20 0.54 -12.69 1.53 -13.37 -5.80 36.21 -18.39 -0.33 -9.18 
 -0.53 0.08 -0.72 0.06 -0.80 -0.37 0.72 -0.55 -0.05 -1.34 
Average age of adult hh members -0.694 0.007 7.532 8.863 -9.613 -6.966 -3.581 -14.226 2.493 -3.547 
 -0.28 0.00 1.65 1.35 -1.75 -1.50 -0.21 -1.54 1.26 -1.74 
Child of hh head 34.37 53.30 -2.65 -340.70 163.02 -55.38 433.34 250.16 -57.24 126.82 
 0.50 0.85 -0.02 -2.33 1.19 -0.48 0.93 1.07 -1.07 2.53 
Vocational school -68.22 6.03 -41.95 -82.20 -64.17 -64.33 -60.35 133.34 -16.86 -27.71 
 -2.56 0.27 -0.62 -0.90 -0.96 -1.05 -0.48 1.30 -0.81 -1.41 
Change in hukou 49.48 90.66 102.41 118.24 168.87 104.17 -138.86 343.96 32.29 6.76 
 1.08 2.67 1.07 1.24 1.96 1.19 -0.70 1.32 1.06 0.29 
Big city -16.38 -10.46 -122.68 -64.23 -23.11 -109.65 -130.13 -108.69 48.57 15.15 
 -0.74 -0.54 -2.35 -1.01 -0.40 -2.12 -0.85 -1.11 2.13 0.67 
Coastal Province -124.08 -6.923 70.339 -23.539 -119.96 -117.79 169.409 -120.25 -79.970 14.648 
 -4.29 -0.26 0.97 -0.23 -1.81 -1.94 0.77 -0.66 -3.14 0.51 
Central Province -13.107 10.842 155.477 -22.931 27.400 65.043 99.163 -255.05 19.988 16.797 
 -0.48 0.49 2.48 -0.26 0.42 1.06 0.50 -1.55 0.84 0.79 
Constant term 2094.7 1561.8 1899.7 2493.8 3984.6 5691.7 5808.3 2661.1 2058.0 2167.1 
 3.68 3.01 1.77 1.64 3.02 4.66 2.25 0.97 5.11 4.18 
           
# obs. 1315 2056 383 295 781 986 86 125 1368 1686 
R² 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.29 0.22 0.02 0.01 
Note: T-statistics in italics. 
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Appendix B3 - Hours worked functions by economic sector, Year: 1995 
  Competitive Oligopolistic Public Services Government 
  Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men 
         
Education -3.304 0.331 3.612 -38.315 -3.807 2.302 11.438 10.413 
 -0.51 0.06 0.26 -1.50 -0.52 0.28 1.66 1.09 
Age -11.48 -3.88 -29.77 -10.85 14.21 19.11 3.28 -14.77 
 -1.07 -0.47 -1.30 -0.40 1.05 1.14 0.22 -1.00 
(Age)² 0.137 0.029 0.464 0.205 -0.198 -0.219 -0.026 0.074 
 0.94 0.29 1.55 0.61 -1.13 -1.14 -0.12 0.43 
Communist -17.45 19.14 3.37 14.31 11.33 38.76 17.16 67.69 
 -0.82 1.18 0.04 0.30 0.44 1.22 0.58 2.32 
Married -65.51 76.88 -105.26 -325.50 -30.87 -78.56 20.32 225.64 
 -1.93 1.91 -1.30 -1.94 -0.50 -0.92 0.42 1.46 
Square root of household size 336.5 -591.5 -1334.6 -519.1 -137.5 -644.0 -105.1 913.7 
 1.00 -1.66 -1.22 -0.77 -0.28 -1.05 -0.18 1.16 
Dependent elderly in the household 3.79 14.27 83.33 34.58 -31.20 36.01 -71.99 -92.81 
 0.13 0.53 1.82 0.51 -0.63 0.72 -1.79 -1.49 
Household size -57.3 177.4 397.3 136.5 74.5 201.4 20.9 -229.2 
 -0.64 1.87 1.34 0.80 0.58 1.23 0.13 -1.14 
Average education of adult hh members -5.57 -10.22 -10.27 3.90 1.92 15.82 -8.99 -2.01 
 -1.00 -2.01 -0.79 0.21 0.25 1.42 -1.01 -0.19 
Average age of adult hh members -1.065 -1.728 -9.993 -7.324 2.816 0.062 -0.033 6.875 
 -0.68 -1.13 -2.69 -1.66 1.34 0.02 -0.01 1.87 
Child of hh head -72.49 64.99 -15.21 -149.58 2.53 -16.50 61.38 28.96 
 -1.66 1.41 -0.16 -1.14 0.04 -0.18 0.94 0.18 
Vocational school 17.95 12.59 37.77 -83.85 -1.83 166.32 47.46 85.32 
 0.75 0.60 0.62 -0.90 -0.05 2.50 0.99 1.58 
Change in hukou 1.91 32.19 93.33 43.52 -48.79 -1.20 17.12 -11.46 
 0.07 1.40 1.30 0.62 -1.38 -0.03 0.47 -0.33 
Big city -31.47 -59.26 -49.41 108.56 -38.72 13.83 20.12 27.52 
 -2.32 -3.99 -1.01 1.93 -1.77 0.47 0.67 0.84 
Coastal Province 32.838 29.734 58.594 -2.980 -37.314 -84.781 -9.381 -39.783 
 1.94 1.96 1.08 -0.05 -1.42 -2.64 -0.29 -1.18 
Constant term 2217.1 2921.8 4225.6 3748.1 1927.7 2142.5 2138.6 1197.0 
 5.68 8.07 3.79 5.05 3.59 3.46 4.00 1.55 
         
# obs. 3019 3324 312 295 791 675 477 772 
R² 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 
Note: T-statistics in italics. 
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Appendix B4 - Hours worked functions by economic sector, Year: 2002 
  Competitive Oligopolistic Public Services Government 
  Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men 
         
Education -18.246 -19.778 10.465 -4.982 12.067 3.859 -6.475 -10.598 
 -2.17 -2.71 0.79 -0.42 1.17 0.36 -0.82 -1.42 
Age -24.89 -22.42 9.52 17.11 -12.38 -9.83 -54.07 2.19 
 -1.63 -1.55 0.39 0.82 -0.66 -0.45 -2.03 0.15 
(Age)² 0.316 0.225 -0.222 -0.192 0.141 0.154 0.654 -0.069 
 1.57 1.34 -0.71 -0.78 0.56 0.58 1.86 -0.41 
Communist -37.99 -102.61 -27.80 -50.79 -57.21 -36.28 53.95 -7.25 
 -1.25 -3.97 -0.72 -1.06 -1.79 -1.15 1.45 -0.23 
Married -74.71 10.93 132.44 78.83 24.66 10.40 9.74 68.10 
 -1.46 0.16 1.23 0.65 0.34 0.13 0.12 1.34 
Square root of household size -687.2 -1640.7 1453.9 2061.1 1027.8 -605.5 -227.0 976.3 
 -1.08 -2.23 1.95 1.92 1.78 -0.62 -0.32 2.05 
Dependent elderly in the household -65.03 -45.31 -91.37 -8.25 78.14 -7.88 -21.70 -34.08 
 -1.65 -1.05 -1.20 -0.10 1.04 -0.13 -0.39 -0.80 
Household size 241.2 478.7 -366.0 -501.1 -326.6 124.4 122.7 -269.6 
 1.34 2.36 -1.89 -1.73 -2.05 0.46 0.65 -2.25 
Average education of adult hh members -12.06 -8.60 -2.25 18.66 -16.46 -10.66 4.33 -2.51 
 -1.38 -0.99 -0.17 1.31 -1.28 -0.86 0.38 -0.27 
Average age of adult hh members -5.105 -5.044 6.682 1.035 0.912 -5.934 3.568 1.217 
 -1.89 -1.97 1.53 0.22 0.24 -1.79 0.83 0.46 
Child of hh head 75.25 -21.98 89.46 107.29 -80.34 98.08 -137.99 20.41 
 1.18 -0.28 0.71 0.93 -0.87 1.01 -1.24 0.28 
Vocational school -50.17 10.25 -41.33 -66.01 -57.01 -63.16 56.49 15.47 
 -1.70 0.33 -0.85 -1.55 -1.96 -2.12 1.40 0.54 
Change in hukou 100.93 86.65 5.47 66.39 73.87 45.76 14.87 -9.52 
 2.11 2.08 0.07 1.10 1.61 1.16 0.38 -0.30 
Big city -46.82 -134.44 -17.01 62.16 14.50 -21.55 -23.12 47.72 
 -1.76 -5.50 -0.37 1.23 0.49 -0.65 -0.57 1.41 
Coastal Province -130.508 -39.563 -81.650 -87.988 -82.749 43.092 -10.280 -10.137 
 -5.14 -1.57 -1.90 -1.89 -2.49 1.00 -0.22 -0.27 
Constant term 3830.3 4837.8 227.9 -503.7 1625.9 3249.3 2991.9 1344.0 
 6.01 6.72 0.25 -0.46 2.44 3.15 4.46 2.38 
         
# obs. 2252 2500 293 413 775 785 424 753 
R² 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 
Note: T-statistics in italics. 
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Appendix B5 - Hours worked functions by region, Year: 1995 
  Coast Centre West Municipality North-East 
  Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men 
           
Education -6.264 -23.347 7.369 6.381 5.667 7.753 9.641 0.575 -18.242 8.579 
 -0.57 -2.69 1.00 1.08 0.76 1.02 0.94 0.04 -1.64 0.80 
Age -11.534 6.296 -19.792 -19.536 6.024 8.235 -20.964 39.445 2.323 -11.361 
 -0.72 0.49 -1.77 -1.89 0.48 0.77 -1.72 1.43 0.10 -0.53 
(Age)² 0.174 -0.081 0.249 0.238 -0.089 -0.125 0.231 -0.481 -0.025 0.143 
 0.79 -0.55 1.69 1.89 -0.51 -0.98 1.41 -1.65 -0.09 0.54 
Communist -69.536 -36.777 -20.465 35.000 0.357 56.788 92.100 82.706 22.086 -5.994 
 -1.75 -1.36 -0.84 1.79 0.02 2.81 2.11 1.67 0.50 -0.15 
Married -31.415 -23.390 -51.422 93.395 -50.179 66.056 10.205 -34.288 -14.583 62.072 
 -0.50 -0.32 -1.08 1.57 -1.01 1.16 0.26 -0.20 -0.19 0.84 
Square root of household size -892.9 -821.5 869.8 -252.3 816.7 231.8 440.8 -1325.6 -773.4 -1775.1 
 -1.97 -1.54 1.64 -0.55 2.01 0.56 0.74 -0.95 -1.03 -1.69 
Dependent elderly in the household -50.132 -6.811 -10.238 7.812 61.673 21.094 50.098 24.713 15.994 -9.675 
 -1.30 -0.15 -0.29 0.24 1.54 0.56 1.73 0.43 0.15 -0.19 
Household size 291.4 236.6 -213.7 60.9 -195.6 -44.2 -138.1 341.1 266.3 492.1 
 2.39 1.66 -1.56 0.51 -1.81 -0.41 -0.87 0.93 1.26 1.79 
Average education of adult hh members -10.829 1.177 -5.540 -8.647 -9.496 -14.536 -13.949 8.784 7.141 -6.209 
 -1.22 0.13 -0.76 -1.35 -1.51 -2.25 -1.55 0.50 0.52 -0.50 
Average age of adult hh members 0.477 -1.544 -1.936 -3.920 0.313 -0.090 -2.366 0.689 -0.421 -0.083 
 0.19 -0.71 -0.91 -1.82 0.16 -0.04 -1.12 0.14 -0.14 -0.02 
Child of hh head 75.484 148.396 -87.927 130.582 -38.511 43.248 -80.981 33.353 0.554 -26.255 
 1.23 1.85 -1.52 2.00 -0.61 0.58 -2.03 0.26 0.01 -0.30 
Vocational school 58.201 -44.194 51.005 78.304 21.001 37.609 -28.868 -29.766 5.420 52.365 
 1.17 -1.18 1.75 2.77 0.77 1.02 -0.64 -0.52 0.16 1.19 
Change in hukou 30.322 44.688 31.066 23.456 -38.681 -9.469 -109.763 101.950 22.055 -3.420 
 0.73 1.38 0.98 0.93 -1.30 -0.35 -1.85 1.06 0.57 -0.05 
Big city -49.381 -42.404 -26.139 -13.340 -29.187 -17.176 - - -60.718 -99.489 
 -1.91 -1.67 -1.29 -0.72 -1.56 -0.76 - - -2.19 -2.25 
Constant term 3227.2 3156.1 1788.4 2880.1 1371.2 1843.8 2418.4 2631.6 2857.8 3993.7 
 6.16 5.55 3.29 6.55 3.01 4.04 4.27 2.17 3.51 3.82 
           
# obs. 1017 1153 1745 2033 1438 1553 356 423 546 634 
R² 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.03 
Note: T-statistics in italics.
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Appendix B6 - Hours worked functions by region, Year: 2002 
  Coast Centre West Municipality North-East 
  Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men 
           
Education -24.680 -15.043 -29.159 -16.376 -1.805 -22.933 12.724 -32.527 -27.263 -7.632 
 -1.76 -1.27 -3.02 -1.96 -0.20 -3.03 0.96 -2.51 -2.00 -0.71 
Age -32.931 -8.793 -30.722 15.195 -28.039 -40.128 -27.231 1.933 -15.592 4.233 
 -1.39 -0.37 -1.47 0.93 -1.41 -2.11 -1.04 0.10 -0.57 0.16 
(Age)² 0.385 0.045 0.377 -0.175 0.373 0.429 0.129 -0.072 0.237 -0.104 
 1.25 0.16 1.31 -0.89 1.45 1.99 0.41 -0.32 0.71 -0.36 
Communist -28.556 -86.791 -27.940 -122.885 -58.873 -123.171 20.700 30.892 -107.644 -79.280 
 -0.72 -2.11 -0.87 -4.67 -1.88 -4.36 0.39 0.59 -2.08 -1.93 
Married 32.192 47.179 -36.532 33.559 -47.063 19.562 171.904 -94.527 11.022 -73.636 
 0.36 0.50 -0.52 0.45 -0.68 0.19 1.39 -0.87 0.11 -0.43 
Square root of household size -559.1 513.4 -154.5 -490.2 850.9 -975.2 -1008.2 390.0 -1777.0 -1902.1 
 -0.70 0.63 -0.18 -0.64 1.20 -0.92 -0.66 0.43 -1.39 -1.33 
Dependent elderly in the household -84.368 -93.597 -11.294 -64.155 -62.999 20.735 -38.608 146.980 51.046 26.550 
 -1.39 -1.64 -0.22 -1.44 -1.10 0.28 -0.62 1.52 0.78 0.44 
Household size 176.2 -105.7 83.4 148.4 -191.9 286.9 221.3 -110.7 479.5 521.5 
 0.84 -0.48 0.35 0.71 -0.89 0.98 0.60 -0.45 1.40 1.32 
Average education of adult hh members 0.906 -17.912 2.403 -9.288 -27.228 -11.040 -4.438 27.861 -13.005 -11.400 
 0.07 -1.41 0.25 -1.00 -2.50 -1.20 -0.31 1.50 -0.90 -0.84 
Average age of adult hh members 0.379 -0.467 0.376 -3.966 -6.141 -6.354 8.063 -3.504 -10.772 -2.938 
 0.11 -0.13 0.11 -1.24 -1.62 -2.02 1.63 -0.84 -2.64 -0.61 
Child of hh head 95.840 -42.404 -10.068 89.408 23.018 -51.560 -92.786 -45.695 111.619 -168.735 
 0.87 -0.51 -0.14 1.02 0.23 -0.44 -0.62 -0.49 0.98 -1.24 
Vocational school -47.683 -3.256 -108.498 -67.207 -76.243 -45.343 34.987 88.532 15.963 -35.430 
 -1.07 -0.08 -3.92 -2.49 -2.40 -1.58 0.74 1.72 0.38 -0.89 
Change in hukou 112.556 -65.124 85.118 45.600 -15.019 51.905 25.631 247.411 -72.604 201.230 
 1.90 -1.40 1.97 1.40 -0.26 1.23 0.28 1.50 -0.56 1.83 
Big city -40.351 -99.741 11.917 -8.247 -10.235 -65.638 0.000 0.000 91.759 19.450 
 -1.16 -2.90 0.37 -0.29 -0.31 -2.17 . . 1.57 0.37 
Constant term 3499.4 2413.3 3188.2 2823.1 2452.1 4654.7 3452.4 2123.9 4842.9 4400.7 
 3.71 2.57 3.99 3.71 3.59 4.53 2.32 2.26 3.65 3.39 
           
# obs. 818 994 1417 1883 1155 1421 367 432 431 619 
R² 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.04 
Note: T-statistics in italics.
